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Carpenter v. United States
16-402
Ruling Below: United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
Carpenter and three other accomplices were charged with robbery and violating the Hobbs Act.
As evidence, the state presented cell-site data gathered without a warrant. Carpenter moved to
suppress the evidence on the ground that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights on the basis
that the FBI should have acquired a warrant with probable cause prior to collecting said data.
The Court denied his motion. Carpenter appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cellphone records
revealing the location and movements of a cellphone user over the course of 127 days is
permitted by the Fourth Amendment.
United States of America,
v.
Timothy Carpenter.
United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit
Decided on April 13, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In Fourth
Amendment cases the Supreme Court has
long recognized a distinction between the
content of a communication and the
information necessary to convey it. Content,
per this distinction, is protected under the
Fourth Amendment, but routing information
is not. Here, Timothy Carpenter and Timothy
Sanders were convicted of nine armed
robberies in violation of the Hobbs Act. The
government’s evidence at trial included
business records from the defendants’
wireless carriers, showing that each man used
his cellphone within a half-mile to two miles
of several robberies during the times the
robberies occurred. The defendants argue
that the government’s collection of those
records constituted a warrantless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In
making that argument, however, the
defendants elide both the distinction
described above and the difference between

GPS tracking and the far less precise
locational information that the government
obtained here. We reject the defendants’
Fourth Amendment argument along with
numerous others, and affirm the district
court’s judgment.
I.
In April 2011, police arrested four men
suspected of committing a string of armed
robberies at Radio Shacks and T-Mobile
stores in and around Detroit. One of the men
confessed that the group had robbed nine
different stores in Michigan and Ohio
between December 2010 and March 2011,
supported by a shifting ensemble of 15 other
men who served as getaway drivers and
lookouts. The robber who confessed to the
crimes gave the FBI his own cellphone
number and the numbers of other
participants; the FBI then reviewed his call
records to identify still more numbers that he
had called around the time of the robberies.
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At trial, seven accomplices testified that
Carpenter organized most of the robberies
and often supplied the guns. They also
testified that Carpenter and his half-brother
Sanders had served as lookouts during the
robberies. According to these witnesses,
Carpenter typically waited in a stolen car
across the street from the targeted store. At
his signal, the robbers entered the store,
brandished their guns, herded customers and
employees to the back, and ordered the
employees to fill the robbers’ bags with new
smartphones. After each robbery, the team
met nearby to dispose of the guns and
getaway vehicle and to sell the stolen
phones.

In May and June 2011, the FBI applied for
three orders from magistrate judges to obtain
“transactional records” from various wireless
carriers for 16 different phone numbers. As
part of those applications, the FBI recited that
these records included “[a]ll subscriber
information, toll records and call detail
records including listed and unlisted numbers
dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from
[the] target telephones from December 1,
2010 to present[,]” as well as “cell site
information for the target telephones at call
origination and at call termination for
incoming and outgoing calls[.]” The FBI also
stated that these records would “provide
evidence that Timothy Sanders, Timothy
Carpenter and other known and unknown
individuals” had violated the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951. The magistrates granted the
applications pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act, under which the
government may require the disclosure of
certain telecommunications records when
“specific and articulable facts show[] that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d).

FBI agent Christopher Hess offered expert
testimony regarding the cell-site data
provided by Carpenter’s and Sanders’s
wireless carriers, MetroPCS and T-Mobile.
Hess explained that cellphones work by
establishing a radio connection with nearby
cell towers (or “cell sites”); that phones are
constantly searching for the strongest signal
from those towers; and that individual towers
project different signals in each direction or
“sector,” so that a cellphone located on the
north side of a cell tower will use a different
signal than a cellphone located on the south
side of the same tower. Hess said that cell
towers are typically spaced widely in rural
areas, where a tower’s coverage might reach
as far as 20 miles. In an urban area like
Detroit, however, each cell site covers
“typically anywhere from a half-mile to two
miles.” He testified that wireless carriers
typically log and store certain call-detail
records of their customers’ calls, including
the date, time, and length of each call; the
phone numbers engaged on the call; and the
cell sites where the call began and ended.
With the cell-site data provided by
Carpenter’s and Sanders’s wireless carriers,
Hess created maps showing that Carpenter’s
and Sanders’s phones were within a half-mile

The government later charged Carpenter with
six counts, and Sanders with two, of aiding
and abetting robbery that affected interstate
commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, and
aiding and abetting the use or carriage of a
firearm during a federal crime of
violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1951(a).
Before trial, Carpenter and Sanders moved to
suppress the government’s cell-site evidence
on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that
the records could be seized only with a
warrant supported by probable cause. The
district court denied the motion.
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to two miles of the location of each of the
robberies around the time the robberies
happened. Hess used MetroPCS call-detail
records, for example, to show that Carpenter
was within that proximity of a Detroit Radio
Shack that was robbed around 10:35 a.m. on
December
13,
2010.
Specifically, MetroPCS records showed that
at 10:24 a.m. Carpenter’s phone received a
call that lasted about four minutes. At the
start and end of the call, Carpenter’s phone
drew its signal from MetroPCS tower 173,
sectors 1 and 2, located southwest of the store
and whose signals point northnortheast. After
the robbery, Carpenter placed an eightminute call originating at tower 145, sector 3,
located northeast of the store, its signal
pointing southwest; when the call ended,
Carpenter’s phone was receiving its signal
from tower 164, sector 1, alongside Interstate
94,
north
of
the
Radio
Shack. See Carpenter App’x at 11. Hess
provided similar analysis concerning the
locations of Carpenter’s and Sanders’s
phones at the time of a December 18, 2010
robbery in Detroit; a March 4, 2011 robbery
in Warren, Ohio; and an April 5, 2011
robbery in Detroit. See Carpenter App’x at
12-15.

A.
Carpenter and Sanders challenge the district
court’s denial of their motion to exclude their
cell-site data from the evidence at trial. Those
data themselves took the form of business
records created and maintained by the
defendants’ wireless carriers: when the
defendants made or received calls with their
cellphones, the phones sent a signal to the
nearest cell-tower for the duration of the call;
the providers then made records, for billing
and other business purposes, showing which
towers each defendant’s phone had signaled
during each call. The government thereafter
collected those records, and hence these cellsite data, for a range of dates (127 days of
records for Carpenter, 88 days for Sanders)
encompassing the robberies at issue here. The
government did so pursuant to a court order
issued under the Stored Communications
Act, which required the government to show
“reasonable grounds” for believing that the
records were “relevant and material to an
ongoing investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
Carpenter and Sanders argue that the Fourth
Amendment instead required the government
to obtain a search warrant, pursuant to a
showing of probable cause, before collecting
the data. The district court rejected that
argument, holding that the government’s
collection of cell-site records created and
maintained by defendants’ wireless carriers
was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment. We review the district court’s
decision de novo. See United States v. Lee,
793 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2015).

The jury convicted Carpenter and Sanders on
all of the Hobbs Act counts and convicted
Carpenter on all but one of the § 924(c) gun
counts. Carpenter’s convictions on the §
924(c) counts subjected him to four
mandatory-minimum prison sentences of 25
years, each to be served consecutively,
leaving him with a Sentencing Guidelines
range
of
1,395
to
1,428
months’ imprisonment. The district court
sentenced Carpenter to 1,395 months’
imprisonment and Sanders to 170 months’
imprisonment. Carpenter and Sanders now
appeal their convictions and sentences.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “[F]or most of our history
the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government

II.
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trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.” United
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct 945, 950 (2012).
Government trespasses upon those areas
normally count as a search. Id. In Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), however,
the Supreme Court moved beyond a
property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, to protect certain expectations
of privacy as well. To fall within these
protections, an expectation of privacy must
satisfy “a twofold requirement”: first, the
person asserting it must “have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”;
and second, that expectation must “be one
that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
When an expectation of privacy meets both
of these requirements, government action
that “invade[s]” the expectation normally
counts as a search. Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979).

his affections.” Our Letters, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 12, 1872, at 4.
In the twentieth century, the telephone call
joined the letter as a standard form of
communication. The law eventually
followed, recognizing that police cannot
eavesdrop on a phone call—even a phone call
placed from a public phone booth—without a
warrant. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-55. But
again the Supreme Court distinguished
between a communication’s content and the
information necessary to send it. In Katz, the
Court held that “[t]he Government’s
activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner’s words” was a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
353 (emphasis added). But in Smith, the
Court held that the police’s installation of a
pen register—a device that tracked the phone
numbers a person dialed from his home
phone—was not a search because the caller
could not reasonably expect those numbers to
remain private. “Although [the caller’s]
conduct may have been calculated to keep
the contents of his conversation private, his
conduct was not and could not have been
calculated to preserve the privacy of the
number he dialed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 743
(emphasis in original). Today, the same
distinction
applies
to
internet
communications. The Fourth Amendment
protects the content of the modern-day letter,
the email. See United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). But courts
have not (yet, at least) extended those
protections to the internet analogue to
envelope markings, namely the metadata
used to route internet communications, like
sender and recipient addresses on an email, or
IP addresses. See, e.g., United States v.
Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir.
2010); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d
1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th
Cir. 2007).

This case involves an asserted privacy
interest in information related to personal
communications. As to that kind of
information, the federal courts have long
recognized a core distinction: although the
content of personal communications is
private, the information necessary to get
those communications from point A to point
B is not. For example, in Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), the Court held that
postal inspectors needed a search warrant to
open letters and packages, but that the
“outward form and weight” of those
mailings— including, of course, the
recipient’s name and physical address—was
not constitutionally protected. Id. That was
true even though that information could
sometimes bring embarrassment: “In a small
village, for instance, a young gentleman may
not altogether desire that all the loungers
around the store which contains the Postoffice shall be joking about the fair object of
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equipment that their calls are completed.” Id.
at 742. The Court likewise charged
“telephone users” with knowledge that “the
phone company has facilities for recording”
numerical information and that “the phone
company does in fact record this information
for a variety of legitimate business
purposes.” Id. at 743. Thus, the Court held,
Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business.” 442 U.S.
at 744. Hence the numerical information was
not protected under the Fourth Amendment.

The business records here fall on the
unprotected side of this line. Those records
say nothing about the content of any calls.
Instead the records include routing
information, which the wireless providers
gathered in the ordinary course of business.
Carriers necessarily track their customers’
phones across different cell-site sectors to
connect and maintain their customers’ calls.
And carriers keep records of these data to find
weak spots in their network and to determine
whether roaming charges apply, among other
purposes. Thus, the cell-site data—like
mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP
addresses—are information that facilitate
personal communications, rather than part of
the content of those communications
themselves. The government’s collection of
business records containing these data
therefore is not a search. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith confirms the point.
At the outset, the Court observed that Smith
could not claim that “his ‘property’ was
invaded” by the State’s actions, which meant
he could not claim any property-based
protection under the Fourth Amendment.
And as to privacy, the Court hewed precisely
to the content-focused distinction that we
make here. 442 U.S. at 741. The Court
emphasized (literally) that the State’s pen
register did “not acquire the contents of
communications.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Instead, the Court observed, the phone
numbers acquired by the State had been
dialed “as a means of establishing
communication.” Id. Moreover, the Court
pointedly refused to adopt anything like a
“least sophisticated
phone
user”
(to
paraphrase the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act) standard in determining whether phone
users know that they convey that information
to the phone company: “All telephone users
realize that they must ‘convey’ phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is
through telephone company switching

The same things are true as to the locational
information here. The defendants of course
lack any property interest in cell-site records
created and maintained by their wireless
carriers. More to the point, when the
government obtained those records, it did
“not
acquire
the
contents
of
communications.” Id. at 741. Instead, the
defendants’ cellphones signaled the nearest
cell towers—thereby giving rise to the data
obtained by the government here—solely “as
a means of establishing communication.” Id.
Moreover, any cellphone user who has seen
her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must
know that, when she places or receives a call,
her phone “exposes” its location to the
nearest cell tower and thus to the company
that operates the tower. Accord United States
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015)
(en banc); In re Application for Historical
Cell Site Data, 724, F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir.
2013). And any cellphone user who has paid
“roaming” (i.e., out-of-network) charges—or
even cellphone users who have not— should
know that wireless carriers have “facilities
for recording” locational information and that
“the phone company does in fact record this
information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes.” Id. at 743. Thus, for the
same reasons that Smith had no expectation
of privacy in the numerical information at
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the defendants’ expectation of privacy in the
information
those
records
contain. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976); Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 107778. Jones, in contrast, lands near the other
end of the spectrum: there, government
agents secretly attached a GPS device to the
underside of Jones’s vehicle and then
monitored his movements continuously for
four weeks. That sort of government
intrusion presents one set of Fourth
Amendment
questions;
government
collection of business records presents
another. And the question presented here, as
shown above, is answered by Smith.

issue there, the defendants have no such
expectation in the locational information
here. On this point, Smith is binding
precedent.
The defendants and their amicus, the
American Civil Liberties Union, argue
that Jones liberates us to hold otherwise.
In Jones, five Justices (though not the Court
in its majority opinion) agreed that “longer
term GPS monitoring in government
investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy.” 132 S. Ct. at 964
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (same). But
there are at least two problems with
the defendants’ argument as made here. The
first is that the government action in this case
is very different from the government action
in Jones. That distinction matters: in
applying Katz, “it is important to begin by
specifying precisely the nature of the state
activity that is challenged.” Smith, 442 U.S.
at 741 (emphasis added). Whether a
defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in certain information depends in part
on what the government did to get it. A phone
conversation is private when overheard by
means of a wiretap; but that same
conversation is unprotected if an agent is
forced to overhear it while seated on a Delta
flight. Similarly, information that is not
particularly sensitive—say, the color of a
suspect’s vehicle—might be protected if
government agents broke into the suspect’s
garage to get it. Yet information that is highly
sensitive—say, all of a suspect’s creditcharges over a three-month period—is not
protected if the government gets that
information through business records
obtained per a subpoena. See United States
v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir.
1993).

The second problem with the defendants’
reliance on Jones is that—unlike Jones—this
is not a GPS-tracking case. GPS devices are
accurate within about 50 feet, which is
accurate enough to show that the target is
located within an individual building. Data
with that kind of accuracy might tell a story
of trips to “the strip club, the criminal defense
attorney, the by-the hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church,
the gay bar and on and on[.]” Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But here
the cell-site data cannot tell that story.
Instead, per the undisputed testimony at trial,
the data could do no better than locate the
defendants’ cellphones within a 120- (or
sometimes 60-) degree radial wedge
extending between one-half mile and two
miles in length. Which is to say the locational
data here are accurate within a 3.5 million
square-foot to 100 million square-foot area—
as much as 12,500 times less accurate than
the GPS data in Jones. And cell phone
locational data are even less precise in
suburban and rural settings. Areas of this
scale might encompass bridal stores and Bass
Pro Shops, gay bars and straight ones, a
Methodist church and the local mosque. The
ACLU responds that so-called “femtocells”

This case involves business records obtained
from a third party, which can only diminish
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can provide service (and thus identify a
phone’s location) within areas as small as ten
meters. But our task is to decide this case, not
hypothetical ones; and in this case there are
no femtocells to be found. The defendants’
argument is without merit.

society has in a meaningful way already
expressed them, judges should bring a certain
humility to the task of deciding whether those
views are reasonable—lest judges “confuse
their own expectations of privacy,” Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring), with
those that every reasonable person must
hold.

The defendants similarly rely on Riley v.
California, 134 S.Ct 2473, 2485 (2014),
where the Court held the government may not
access a smartphone’s internal data—or, one
might say, its contents—without a warrant.
But the Court’s rationale was that
smartphones typically store vast amounts of
information about their users—vastly more,
of course, than whether the user happens to
be located within a two-mile radial
wedge. Riley only illustrates the core
distinction we make here.

A second point is related. Constitutional
judgments typically rest in part on a set of
empirical
assumptions.
When
those
assumptions concern subjects that judges
know well—say, traffic stops—courts are
well-equipped to make judgments that strike
a reasonable balance among the competing
interests at stake. See Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case For
Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 863 (2004).
But sometimes new technologies—say, the
latest iterations of smartphones or social
media—evolve at rates more common to
superbugs than to large mammals. In those
situations judges are less good at evaluating
the empirical assumptions that underlie their
constitutional judgments. Indeed the answers
to those empirical questions might change as
quickly as the technology itself does. With
regard to the Katz test in particular, for
example, “[d]ramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately
produce significant changes in popular
attitudes.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Congress is usually better
equipped than courts are to answer the
empirical questions that such technologies
present. Thus, “[w]hen technologies are new
and their impact remains uncertain, statutory
rules governing law enforcement powers will
tend
to
be
more
sophisticated,
comprehensive,
forward-thinking,
and
flexible than rules created by the judicial
branch.” Kerr, 102 Mich. L. Rev. at 859-60.

Some other points bear mention. One is that
Congress has specifically legislated on the
question before us today, and in doing so has
struck the balance reflected in the Stored
Communications Act. The Act stakes out a
middle ground between full Fourth
Amendment protection and no protection at
all, requiring that the government show
“reasonable grounds” but not “probable
cause” to obtain the cell-site data at issue
here. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The
defendants and the ACLU effectively ask us
to declare that balance unconstitutional.
There is considerable irony in that request.
The Katz standard
asks
whether
the
defendants’ asserted expectation of privacy
“is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable[.]’” Smith, 442 U.S. at 740
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). Here, one
might say that society itself—in the form of
its elected representatives in Congress—has
already struck a balance that it thinks
reasonable. That is not to say that courts
should defer to Congress’s judgment on
constitutional questions. But when the
question itself turns on society’s views, and
318

These concerns favor leaving undisturbed the
Congressional judgment here.

robbery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1951(a).
We review the district court’s decision de
novo. See United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d
667, 677 (6th Cir. 2008).

In sum, we hold that the government’s
collection of business records containing
cell-site data was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment.

Carpenter was prosecuted in the Eastern
District of Michigan. Venue was proper there
so long as a rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, could find by a preponderance
of the evidence that any of Carpenter’s
accessorial acts, or the underlying crime
itself, occurred in the Eastern District of
Michigan. Relatedly, “[w]here venue is
appropriate for the underlying crime of
violence, so too it is for the § 924(c)(1)
offense.” United States v. RodriguezMoreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282 (1999).

B.
Sanders argues that the district court should
have suppressed the government’s cell-site
evidence for another reason, namely that (in
his view) the government’s applications to
obtain the cell-site records failed to show
“reasonable grounds” for believing that the
records were “relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. §
2703(d). There are several problems with that
argument, but the simplest is that suppression
of evidence is not among the remedies
available under the Stored Communications
Act. Quite the contrary: the statute identifies
a handful of civil remedies, including
“damages” and “equitable or declaratory
relief,” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b), and provides
that those “are the only judicial remedies and
sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of
this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2708; see United
States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th
Cir. 2014). The relief that Sanders seeks is
therefore
unavailable
under
the
Act. See United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547,
556 (6th Cir. 2006).

Here, Carpenter’s accomplices testified that,
while in the Eastern District of Michigan,
Carpenter recruited the robbers for the
Warren robbery, described for them the
robbery’s general scheme, and from there
drove them to Ohio. Two of these witnesses
also testified that, while in Michigan,
Carpenter made arrangements to have
another accomplice supply the robbers with a
gun when they got to Warren. A reasonable
trier of fact could credit this testimony, and
conclude that much of Carpenter’s conduct in
abetting both the Warren robbery and the use
of a firearm during it took place in the Eastern
District of Michigan. The district court
correctly denied Carpenter’s motion for
acquittal on counts seven and eight.

III.
A.

B.

Carpenter argues that the district court erred
when it denied Carpenter’s motion for
acquittal for lack of venue over counts seven
and eight. Those counts charged Carpenter
with aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery
in Warren, Ohio, and with aiding and abetting
the use of a firearm in connection with that

Carpenter argues that the district court should
have allowed him to use a report prepared by
FBI Special Agent Vicente Ruiz to refresh
the memory of government witness Adriane
Foster on cross-examination. We review that
evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
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discretion. See United States v. Morales, 687
F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 2012).

a declarant cannot be used to impeach the
declarant’s later testimony unless the
declarant has attested to the report’s
accuracy. See United States v. Barile, 286
F.3d 749, 757 (4th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1429 & n.3 (7th
Cir. 1993). Foster has not done that here; to
the contrary, Foster testified that Ruiz’s
report would have been wrong if it said that
Sanders rather than Carpenter had told him
about the plans for the Warren robbery. The
district court thus correctly barred the
report’s introduction at trial.
C.

At trial, Carpenter’s counsel cross-examined
Foster—an accomplice of Carpenter—about
Foster’s past statements to Agent Ruiz.
Foster testified that he told Ruiz that
Carpenter had provided Foster with advance
information about the robbery in Warren.
According to Ruiz’s written summary of the
interview, however, Foster told Ruiz that
Sanders, not Carpenter, had provided Foster
with advance information about the robbery.
Carpenter’s counsel sought to introduce
Ruiz’s report to “refresh [Foster’s] memory”
of the interview.

1.
Carpenter’s remaining argument is that his
1,395-month sentence is so disproportionate
to his crimes as to violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. He also argues that his
mandatory-minimum sentences for his §
924(c) convictions violate the constitutional
separation of powers. We consider both
issues de novo. See United States v. Kelsor,
665 F.3d 684, 701 (6th Cir. 2011).

A document may be used to refresh a
witness’s memory only after his memory has
been “exhausted.” Rush v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
399 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). Here,
Foster seemed to have no trouble
remembering his conversation with Agent
Ruiz. Foster repeatedly testified that he did
remember telling Ruiz that Timothy
Carpenter—not Timothy Sanders—had told
him about the plans for the Warren robbery.
Carpenter’s counsel then asked Foster
whether he remembered “saying something
different” to Ruiz. Foster said that he did not.
That answer did not show that Foster’s
memory needed refreshing; it showed that
Foster disagreed with Carpenter about what
Foster had told Ruiz. What Carpenter
actually sought to do with the report was not
refresh Ruiz’s memory, but impeach his
testimony. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that Carpenter could not
use the report for that purpose.

“[O]nly an extreme disparity between crime
and
sentence
offends
the
Eighth
Amendment.” United States v. Odeneal, 517
F.3d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). In Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited a state court from sentencing to
life imprisonment without parole a recidivist
criminal who wrote a bad check for $100. But
in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003),
the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth
Amendment claim of a defendant who was
sentenced to 25 years to life for stealing
several golf clubs. 538 U.S. at 28-30.
Carpenter has a long criminal history. In this
case, as the district court observed, Carpenter
organized and led several “very violent”
robberies that put his victims “in extreme

To the same end, Carpenter argues that the
district court should have allowed him to
introduce Ruiz’s report as extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement under
Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). But an FBI
agent’s written summary of an interview with
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danger[.]” Meanwhile, in other armedrobbery cases, we have already held that
sentences even longer than Carpenter’s were
constitutionally
permissible. See United
States v. Clark, 634 F.3d 874, 877-78 (6th
Cir. 2011) (2,269 months); United States v.
Watkins, 509 F.3d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 2007)
(1,772 months). Carpenter’s sentence does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.

that a co-participant would commit
them. See United States v. Woods, 604 F.3d
286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010).
That standard is met here. During the January
7,
2011
robbery,
Sanders’s
accomplice Juston Young returned to the
getaway car with gun in hand. Thus, when
Sanders teamed up with Young and others for
another robbery on March 4, Sanders could
have easily foreseen that Young would
brandish a firearm in the course of the
crime—as in fact Young did. The district
court did not clearly err in finding that the
firearm enhancement applied to Sanders.

Nor do his mandatory-minimum sentences
violate the constitutional separation of
powers. “Congress has the power to define
criminal punishments without giving the
courts any sentencing discretion.” Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991).
Carpenter acknowledges that we have “flatly
rejected” his argument in other cases.
Carpenter Br. at 54; see, e.g., United States v.
Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2010). This
case is no different.
2.

Nor did the court err in finding that Sanders
could foresee that Young would physically
restrain someone during the March 4 robbery.
As a general matter, an accomplice to robbery
should foresee that robbery likely entails
physical restraint or worse. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.2 (2012). And Sanders knew specifically
that the plan for that robbery was for the
robbers to move customers and employees to
the back of the store. The physical-restraint
enhancement was therefore proper. That
leaves an enhancement for brandishing a
firearm during the January 7 robbery. But
that enhancement had no effect on Sanders’s
Guidelines range: the offense level for the
March 4 robbery was higher than the offense
level for the January 7 robbery, even with the
brandishing enhancement; and the offense
level for the March 4 robbery, not the January
7 one, thus determined his total offense
level under the Guidelines. Any error as to
the brandishing enhancement for the January
7 robbery was therefore harmless. See United
States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 574-76 (6th
Cir. 2008).
Finally, the district court acted within its
discretion in sentencing Sanders to 170
months’ imprisonment, which fell squarely
within his Guidelines range of 151 to 188

Sanders challenges his sentence on nonconstitutional grounds, arguing that the
district court misapplied the Sentencing
Guidelines and that his sentence is “greater
than necessary” to accomplish the remedial
objectives of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553. We review for clear error the district
court’s factual findings in support of
Sanders’s sentence, and review the sentence
itself for an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Randolph, 794 F.3d 602, 614 (6th
Cir. 2015).
Sanders argues first that the district court
incorrectly applied sentencing enhancements
for brandishing or possessing a firearm in
furtherance of robbery, and for physically
restraining a person in furtherance of a
robbery. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(C),
(b)(4)(B). Sanders himself need not have
committed those acts in order for the
enhancements to apply; rather, he need only
have known it was “reasonably probable”
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months. Within Guidelines sentences are
presumptively
reasonable
in
this
circuit. See United States v. Kamper, 748
F.3d 728, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2014). Moreover,
the district court considered and rejected the
arguments that Sanders raised at his
sentencing hearing, and otherwise properly
determined that the sentence was appropriate
in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court did
not abuse its discretion.

and Sanders could have been obtained under
the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The
question is whether it should have been
sought through provisions of the SCA
directing the government to obtain a warrant
with a probable cause showing, 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(1)(A), or a court order based on the
specified “reasonable grounds[,]” id. §§
2703(c)(1)(B), (d). This leads us to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

The judgments in both cases are affirmed.

Fourth Amendment law was complicated in
the time of paper correspondence and land
phone lines. The addition of cellular (not to
mention internet) communication has left
courts struggling to determine if (and how)
existing tests apply or whether new tests
should be framed. I am inclined to favor the
latter approach for several reasons,
particularly one suggested by Justice
Sotomayor: “[I]t may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).

CONCURRENCE
STRANCH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join
Parts II.B and III of the majority opinion,
which resolve Carpenter’s and Sanders’s
statutory, evidentiary, and sentencing claims.
I concur only in the judgment with respect to
Part II.A because I believe that the sheer
quantity of sensitive information procured
without a warrant in this case raises Fourth
Amendment concerns of the type the
Supreme Court and our circuit acknowledged
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring), and in United
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir.
2012). Though I write to address those
concerns, particularly the nature of the tests
we apply in this rapidly changing area of
technology, I find it unnecessary to reach a
definitive conclusion on the Fourth
Amendment issue. I concur with the majority
on the basis that were there a Fourth
Amendment violation, I would hold that the
district court’s denial of Carpenter and
Sanders’s motion to suppress was
nevertheless proper because some extension
of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule would be appropriate.
A.
Fourth
Amendment
Concerns

It is easier to see why the existing tests
present problems than it is to articulate a test
that will not. This difficulty is exemplified by
the two conceptual categories under the
Fourth Amendment found in this case and the
law that governs each. The majority
accurately describes two different strains of
law, one addressing the distinction between
GPS tracking and the less accurate CSLI
obtained and used in this case and the other
“between the content of a communication
and the information necessary to convey it.”
(Majority Op. at 2.) To understand whether
and how the tests established in these two

At issue here is not whether the cell-site
location information (CSLI) for Carpenter
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cell phone for three days. Such ‘relatively
short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized
as
reasonable.’” Id.
(quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring)). But Skinner framed this
conclusion with a key caveat: “There may be
situations where police, using otherwise legal
methods, so comprehensively track a
person’s
activities
that
the
very
comprehensiveness of the tracking is
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes.” Id.

different strains of Fourth Amendment law
might apply requires a brief review of each.
First, the distinction between GPS tracking
and CSLI acquisition. CSLI does appear to
provide significantly less precise information
about a person’s whereabouts than GPS and,
consequently, I agree that a person’s privacy
interest in the CSLI his or her cell phone
generates
may
indeed
be
lesser. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955
(Sotomayor,
J.,
concurring)
(“GPS
monitoring
generates
a
precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.”); id. at
963 (Alito, J., concurring) (“For older
phones, the accuracy of the location
information depends on the density of the
tower network, but new ‘smart phones,’
which are equipped with a GPS device,
permit more precise tracking.”).

Primarily analyzing this case under the tests
established for the assertion of a privacy
interest in business records, the majority here
determines that the CSLI is unprotected
because it deals with routing or conveying
information, not the content of the related
communications. (Majority Op. at 6–8.) This
analysis reflects a valid distinction in that
arena of the law. It is here, however, that my
concern arises with the existing tests. It
seems to me that our case resides at the
intersection of the law governing tracking of
personal location and the law governing
privacy interests in business records. This
case involves tracking physical location
through cell towers and a personal phone, a
device routinely carried on the individual’s
person; it also involves the compelled
provision of records that reflect such
tracking. In light of the personal tracking
concerns articulated in our precedent, I am
not convinced that the situation before us can
be addressed appropriately with a test
primarily used to obtain business records
such as credit card purchases—records that
do not necessarily reflect personal location.
And it seems to me that the business records
test is ill suited to address the issues regarding
personal location that are before us. I
therefore return to the law governing
location.

But precision is not the only variable with
legal significance. In United States v.
Skinner, we addressed the government’s use
of GPS data emitted by a suspect’s cell phone
to track the suspect’s whereabouts over the
course of three days. Skinner, 690 F.3d at
774–76. The tracking took place pursuant to
a court order authorizing the suspect’s phone
company to provide the government access to
the GPS data emitted by the suspect’s pay-asyou-go cell phone. See id. at 776. The
majority opinion there acknowledged “the
concern raised by Justice Alito’s concurrence
in Jones” that long-term location monitoring
in government investigations impinges on
expectations of privacy, but held that the
concern was not implicated in Skinner’s case
because of the relatively short tracking
period. Id. at 780. It distinguished Jones,
explaining that “[w]hile Jones involved
intensive monitoring over a 28-day period,
here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s
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proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure.” Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 347 (1987). The exclusionary rule
is not intended “to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim[.] . . . Instead, the
rule’s prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures[.]” United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). “As with any
remedial device, application of the
exclusionary rule properly has been restricted
to those situations in which its remedial
purpose is effectively advanced.” Krull, 480
U.S. at 347.

I begin by acknowledging that this case
involves CSLI that does not reach the
specificity of GPS. Nonetheless, Skinner
recognizes “situations where police, using
otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively
track a person’s activities that the very
comprehensiveness of the tracking is
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes.” Skinner, 690 F.3d at 780. The
tracking of cell-phone data in this case went
far beyond 3 or even 28 days—the
government procured approximately 127
days of CSLI records for Carpenter and 88
days for Sanders. That is close to four and
three months, respectively. Even taking into
account the less precise nature of CSLI as
compared to GPS, such extensive monitoring
far
exceeds
the
threshold
we
identified in Skinner and the warrantless
acquisition of such substantial quantities of
CSLI implicates the Skinner/Jones concerns.
I do not think that treating the CSLI obtained
as a “business record” and applying that test
addresses our circuit’s stated concern
regarding long-term, comprehensive tracking
of an individual’s location without a warrant.
At issue here is neither relatively innocuous
routing information nor precise GPS locator
information: it is personal location
information that partakes of both. I am also
concerned about the applicability of a test
that appears to admit to no limitation on the
quantity of records or the length of time for
which such records may be compelled. I
conclude that our precedent suggests the need
to develop a new test to determine when a
warrant may be necessary under these or
comparable circumstances.

This restriction has led the Supreme Court to
articulate certain “exceptions” to the
exclusionary rule. For example, in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that courts generally
should not apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by police officers whose
reliance on a search warrant issued by a
neutral
magistrate
was
objectively
reasonable, even if the warrant was
ultimately found to be defective. See Leon,
468 U.S. at 905– 26; see also id. at 926 (“In
the absence of an allegation that the
magistrate abandoned his detached and
neutral role, suppression is appropriate only
if the officers were dishonest or reckless in
preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause.”). The Court
explained that “when an officer acting with
objective good faith has obtained a search
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted
within its scope[,]” “[p]enalizing the officer
for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at
920–21 (footnote omitted). In Illinois
v. Krull, the Supreme Court extended the
good-faith exception articulated in Leon to

B.
The Exclusionary Rule &
Good-Faith Exception
“When evidence is obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
judicially developed exclusionary rule
usually precludes its use in a criminal
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evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a
statute that is subsequently declared
unconstitutional, reasoning “that the greatest
deterrent to the enactment of unconstitutional
statutes by a legislature is the power of the
courts to invalidate such statutes.” Krull, 480
U.S. at 352; see also id. at 349–350.

here, our circuit has already had occasion to
weigh the propriety of an order under the
SCA and to have found that order
wanting. Warshak explained that “to the
extent that the SCA purports to permit the
government to obtain [a subscriber’s] emails
[from an internet service provider]
warrantlessly,
the
SCA
is
unconstitutional.” Id. at 288. I do not read
that holding as declaring the balance struck
by the SCA unconstitutional. (See Majority
Op. at 10–11.) Warshak simply found that
one proposed interpretation or use of the
SCA as applied did not comply with the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement for a
warrant based on probable cause.
Determining the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment is
the task of the
judiciary. See United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (quoting Zivotofsky
v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012)). The
runaway pace of technological development
makes this task more difficult. But the job is
ours nonetheless and the circumstances
before us lead me to believe that we have
more work to do to determine the best
methods for assessing the application of the
Fourth Amendment in the context of new
technology.

In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest
that the FBI agents who obtained the CSLI of
Carpenter and Sanders pursuant to the SCA
engaged in any intentional misconduct.
Suppressing the CSLI at trial would not have
the requisite deterrent effect on future
unlawful conduct and application of the
exclusionary
rule
is
therefore
inappropriate. See, e.g., United
States
v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 333–34 (6th Cir.
2010) (Keith, J., concurring). Assuming
without deciding that this situation states a
Fourth Amendment violation, I would still
affirm the district court’s denial of Carpenter
and Sanders’s motion to suppress on this
ground.
C.

Judicial Review

One further issue of importance bears
mentioning. The majority may be correct that
Congress is well positioned to gauge
changing public attitudes toward new and
evolving technology. This institutional
advantage may even weigh in favor of
approaching challenges to statutes that
balance privacy and public safety interests
with some caution. But I do not see this case
primarily as a challenge to the
constitutionality of the SCA’s provisions that
authorize the government to seek secured
communications through either an order or a
warrant. The question before us is one that
courts routinely answer: did the search at
issue require a warrant? That the government
sought and obtained an order under the SCA
does not immunize that order from challenge
on Fourth Amendment grounds. As relevant
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“U.S. Supreme Court to settle major cellphone privacy case”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
June 5, 2017

Police officers for the first time could be
required to obtain warrants to get data on the
past locations of criminal suspects based on
cellphone use under a major case on privacy
rights in the digital age taken up by the U.S.
Supreme Court on Monday.

political spectrum about civil liberties and
police evading warrant requirements.
The legal fight has raised questions about
how much companies protect the privacy
rights of their customers. The big four
wireless carriers, Verizon Communications
Inc(VZ.N), AT&T Inc(T.N), T-Mobile US
Inc(TMUS.O) and Sprint Corp(S.N), receive
tens of thousands of requests a year from law
enforcement for what is known as "cell site
location information," or CSLI. The requests
are routinely granted.

The justices agreed to hear an appeal by a
man convicted in a series of armed robberies
in Ohio and Michigan with the help of past
cellphone location data who contends that
without a warrant from a court such data
amounts to an unreasonable search and
seizure under the U.S. Constitution's Fourth
Amendment.

The Supreme Court has twice in recent years
ruled on major cases concerning how
criminal law applies to new technology, on
each occasion
ruling
against
law
enforcement. In 2012, the court held that a
warrant is required to place a GPS tracking
device on a vehicle. Two years later, the court
said police need a warrant to search a
cellphone that is seized during an arrest.

Cellphone location records are becoming
increasingly important to police in criminal
investigations, with authorities routinely
requesting and receiving this information
from wireless providers.
Police helped establish that the man at the
center of the case, Timothy Carpenter, was
near the scene of the robberies at Radio Shack
and T-Mobile stores by securing past "cell
site location information" from his cellphone
carrier that tracked which local cellphone
towers relayed his calls.

The information that law enforcement
agencies can obtain from wireless carriers
shows which local cellphone towers users
connect to at the time they make calls. Police
can use historical data to determine if a
suspect was in the vicinity of a crime scene
or real-time data to track a suspect.

The case reaches the high court amid growing
scrutiny of the surveillance practices of U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence agencies
amid concern among lawmakers across the

Carpenter's bid to suppress the evidence
failed and he was convicted of six robbery
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counts. On appeal, the Cincinnati, Ohiobased 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld his convictions, finding that no
warrant was required for the cellphone
information.

The Trump administration said in court
papers the government has a "compelling
interest" for acquiring the records without a
warrant because the information is
particularly useful at the early stage of a
criminal investigation.

Civil liberties lawyers have said that police
need "probable cause," and therefore a
warrant, in order to avoid constitutionally
unreasonable searches.

"Society has a strong interest in both
promptly apprehending criminals and
exonerating innocent suspects as early as
possible during an investigation," the
administration said in a brief.

'LONGSTANDING PROTECTIONS'
A general view of the U.S. Supreme Court
building in Washington, U.S., November 15,
2016.Carlos Barria

David LaBahn, president of the Association
of Prosecuting Attorneys, said warrants can
be obtained quickly from judges but police
may have problems getting the evidence
needed to show probable cause.

"Because cellphone location records can
reveal countless private details of our lives,
police should only be able to access them by
getting a warrant based on probable cause,"
said Nathan Freed Wessler, a staff attorney
with the American Civil Liberty Union's
Speech, Privacy and Technology Project who
represents Carpenter.

"They may not be able to get over that legal
hurdle, so the court couldn't issue the
warrant," LaBahn said.
Civil liberties groups assert that the 1986 law
did not anticipate the way mobile devices
now contain a wealth of data on each user.

"The time has come for the Supreme Court to
make clear that the longstanding protections
of the Fourth Amendment apply with
undiminished force to these kinds of sensitive
digital records," Wessler added.

Steve Vladeck, a national security and
constitutional law professor at the University
of Texas, said the case will have "enormous
implications" over how much data the
government can obtain from phone
companies and other technology firms about
their customers without a warrant.

But, based on a provision of a 1986 federal
law called the Stored Communications Act,
the government said it does not need probable
cause to obtain customer records. Instead, the
government said, prosecutors must show
only that there are "reasonable grounds" for
the records and that they are "relevant and
material" to an investigation.

"Courts and commentators have tried to
figure out exactly when individuals will have
a continuing expectation of privacy even in
data they've voluntarily shared with a third
party," Vladeck said. "This case squarely
raises that question."

The case will be heard and decided in the
court's next term, which starts in October and
ends in June 2018.
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“Digital Privacy to Come Under Supreme Court’s Scrutiny”
The New York Times
Peter J. Henning
July 10, 2017

In October 1986, the top-rated television
program was “The Cosby Show,” Janet
Jackson’s “When I Think of You” headed the
pop music charts and “Crocodile Dundee”
dominated the box office.

protection, a notion that looks quaint today
when emails and texts may be held for years.
Another provision of the statute allows
investigators to obtain information from the
provider about a subscriber to any electronic
service, like cellphones, by seeking a court
order based on “reasonable grounds to
believe” that the records are relevant to a
criminal investigation. This is a lower
standard than probable cause, the usual
requirement for a search warrant.

Congress, meanwhile, passed an obscure
statute that month called the Stored
Communications Act that has become much
more relevant 30 years later as the Supreme
Court will have two opportunities to help
define the scope of digital privacy under a
law enacted when cellphones and email
hardly existed.

It is this lower threshold for getting
information that is at issue in Carpenter v.
United States, which the Supreme Court will
hear in its next term starting in October.

To obtain electronic communications, the
government must obtain a warrant for any
that are held for 180 days or fewer by a
computer service provider. This means
establishing probable cause that the evidence
sought is related to a crime.

The defendants were convicted of organizing
a string of robberies in the Detroit area where
they served as lookouts by parking near the
stores. The government obtained orders
directing wireless carriers to provide cell site
location information showing where different
numbers linked to the crew conducting the
robberies were at the time of the crimes.
Armed with data from various cell towers,
prosecutors showed at trial that the
defendants’ phones were a half-mile to two
miles from the robberies, helping to link them
to the actual perpetrators.

But for anything older than that, investigators
need only a grand jury or administrative
subpoena, as long as the person whose
communications are sought is informed. That
notification can be delayed by as much as 90
days if disclosure might have an adverse
effect, such as destroying or tampering with
evidence.
Back
in
1986,
Congress
viewed
communications over six months old to be
abandoned and therefore subject to reduced

The defendants sought to suppress that
information, arguing that it constituted a
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search of their phones so that the reasonable
grounds
standard
in
the
Stored
Communications Act for the order did not
meet the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.

especially when a person may enable it by
using an app like Find My Phone.
In a 2012 case, United States v. Jones, the
Supreme Court found that the use of a GPS
tracker attached to a car was a search
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Sonia Sotomayor explained in a concurring
opinion that the privacy interests in a
person’s
specific
location
required
investigators to get a warrant because
gathering that information “enables the
government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati rejected that
claim, finding that “although the content of
personal communications is private, the
information necessary to get those
communications from point A to point B is
not.” Therefore, the defendants had no
privacy interest in the information held by the
carriers about their location and the
constitutional probable cause requirement
did not apply.

In the Carpenter case, the justices will have
to weigh whether cell site data is different
from a GPS tracker because learning where a
person is within about a one-mile radius may
not be a sufficient invasion of privacy to
come within the Fourth Amendment. Nor
does obtaining the location of a cellphone
reveal the content of any communication,
only that a call was made, so the protection
afforded by the Riley decision may not apply.

The Carpenter case raises a fundamental
question about how far the privacy protection
in the Fourth Amendment, which by its terms
applies to “persons, houses, papers and
effects,” should reach in protecting data
generated by a person’s electronic devices.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote in
Riley v. California, a 2014 decision, that
cellphones are now “such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were
an important feature of human anatomy.”

Another case involving the Stored
Communications Act that may come before
the justices concerns the territorial reach of a
warrant authorizing investigators to obtain
emails held by Microsoft. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Manhattan, in Microsoft v. United States,
found that the warrant did not apply to emails
stored on a server in Dublin because there
was no indication in the statute that Congress
intended to authorize a search outside the
United States.

In Riley, the court found that a warrantless
search of an arrestee’s cellphone was
unconstitutional, explaining that what
distinguishes the device from other items that
might be found on a person that the police
could look at “is their immense storage
capacity.” But rummaging through the
contents of a phone or computer is not
necessarily the same as getting site
information that is broadcast to the carrier,

The Justice Department filed a petition with
the Supreme Court on June 22 asking for a
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review of that decision, arguing that it was
“wrong, inconsistent with this court’s
framework for analysis of extraterritoriality
issues, and highly detrimental to criminal law
enforcement.” Those requests are often
granted because the justices rely on the
solicitor general’s office to identify cases that
have
significant
law
enforcement
implications.

different world from the 18th century. The
problem is that legal challenges take a
piecemeal approach to a statute adopted over
30 years ago, and the courts cannot rewrite
provisions that may be hopelessly out of date.
The House of Representatives adopted the
Email Privacy Act in February to modernize
the
protections
afforded
electronic
communications that would require obtaining
a search warrant in almost every case. That
proposal met resistance in the Senate last year
when Attorney General Jeff Sessions, then a
senator from Alabama, sought to add a
provision allowing law enforcement to skip
the warrant requirement in emergency
situations.

Another factor in favor of granting review is
that the Second Circuit’s decision has not
been followed by federal district courts in
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington and
Wisconsin, which have enforced warrants to
produce email records that may have been
stored abroad. A note in the Harvard Law
Review criticized the decision because it “did
not acknowledge the ‘un-territorial’ nature of
data.”

Whether the legislation can get through the
Senate is an open question, and it is not clear
whether President Trump would sign off if
the Justice Department opposes the bill. That
may mean the Supreme Court will have to
establish the broad parameters of digital
privacy while Congress tries to deal with the
intricacies of a world of electronic
communication that evolves rapidly.

Microsoft is fighting the effort to apply the
Stored Communications Act to electronic
records held outside the United States,
pointing out in a company blog post that the
European Union’s new General Data
Protection Regulation scheduled to go into
effect next year will make it illegal to transfer
customer data from Europe to the United
States. That could put global technology
organizations like Google and Microsoft in
the difficult position of balancing demands
for greater privacy with efforts to investigate
crime that could result in large fines for
failure to comply.

Devices connected to the internet, from
cellphones to watches to personal training
trackers that facilitate our personal habits and
communications, are a fact of daily life, and
the Supreme Court will have to start drawing
clear lines around what types of electronic
information are — and are not — protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Simply asserting
that there is a right to privacy does not
provide much help in determining how far
that protection should extend in a digital
world.

Determining how digital information fits
under a constitutional protection adopted
when there were only “persons, homes,
papers and effects” that could be searched
requires the Supreme Court to figure out the
scope of privacy expectations in a very
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“Cell phone privacy case of Michigan criminal goes to U.S. Supreme
Court”
FOX 2- Detroit Local News
Taryn Asher
June 5, 2017

A metro Detroit area man is convicted in a
series of armed robberies in Michigan and
Ohio - but his right to cell phone privacy
could wipe that out.

"People have cell phones with them all the
time, use them for all the details of their lives
without knowing the records of how or when
they use their phones could become available
by the government," Gurewitz said.

He is appealing because of how police got
ahold of cell phone records used to make the
case against him - now the US Supreme Court
will weigh in.

All of this stems from a 2011 federal case
Gurewitz defended when his client, 32 -yearold Timothy Carpenter, was convicted for
robbing several cell phone stores in Michigan
and one in Ohio, sent to prison for the rest of
his life.

Timothy Carpenter will spend the next 116
years in federal prison - but this case could
reverse that decision.

Coincidentally,
federal
investigators
obtained months’ worth of cell phone
location records which helped show where
Carpenter was when he made and received
calls in the general area of the robberies.

"Cell phones were probably the size of a
brick at that time, things have changed a great
deal," said attorney Harold Gurewitz.
Well-known defense attorney Harold
Gurewitz along with the ACLU says that it is
time the law changes too.

That evidence helped lead to his conviction evidence Gurewitz says was obtained without
a search warrant.

On Monday the U.S. Supreme Court decided
to hear a landmark case that could change
how law enforcement obtains cell phone
location records.

"It is our position the evidence shouldn't have
been used at trial and if it had an impact on
the trial," he said. "If it was material and
harmful then it should result in reversal of his
conviction."

Gurewitz says technology has evolved and
advanced
since
the
1986
Stored
Communication Act - which says the
government does not to show probable cause
to get customer cell phone records.

At trial, prosecutors said Carpenter organized
many of the robberies supplied the firearms
and acted as the look out, but Gurewitz says
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that's not what this supreme court case is
about.
"What this case is really about is whether
people have a right to privacy in records that
are created with cell phones," he said.
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“This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn't Require a
Warrant”
The Atlantic
Robinson Meyer
April 14, 2016

The government does not need a warrant to
access the location data created on an
ordinary, often minute-to-minute basis by
cellphones and logged with cell providers,
the Sixth Circuit for the U.S. Court of
Appeals ruled Wednesday.

you can disprove an alibi or reconstruct an
escape route.
Right now, CSLI comes in three flavors. The
first is “real-time,” where police work with a
cell provider to access location data
immediately after it’s created. This usually
does require a warrant. The second is a
“tower dump,” when authorities ask for all
the phones that have communicated with a
certain tower during a period of time. There’s
not a lot of law about how tower dumps work,
but as of September of last year cops rarely
sought a warrant for them.

The ruling adds to a growing consensus
among federal appeals courts that law
enforcement can request this type of data—
called “cell-site location information,” or
CSLI—without violating the Fourth
Amendment’s
protection
against
unreasonable search or seizure. But it only
complicates the legal situation of their use,
which is now so complex that driving across
the border from Illinois to Kentucky changes
how federal authorities can use the
technology.

The third is historical CSLI, where law
enforcement requests a backlog of location
data created by a certain phone. This does not
require a warrant, and hundreds of these
requests happen per day. In 2015, AT&T
alone handled more than 58,000 requests for
historic CSLI. (By contrast, it received about
17,000 real-time CSLI warrants and fewer
than
1,500
tower-dump
requests.)
Warrantless CSLI may be the most common
kind of cellphone surveillance that
Americans are subject to.

Every time a cellphone checks in with its
provider—to send a text message, to start or
end a voice call, or just to get a push
notification—it lodges a time-stamped piece
of location information with the nearest cell
tower. This data, CSLI, isn’t as precise as a
GPS coordinate, but in urban or suburban
areas it can narrow someone’s location down
to less than two miles and give their angular
relationship to the nearest cell tower. String a
set of these time-stamped points together and

The just-decided Sixth Circuit case, U.S. v.
Carpenter and Sanders, is a good example of
how this looks in practice. Between
December 2010 and March 2011, there were
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The Sixth Circuit rejected the ACLU’s
reasoning. Riley covered the wealth of
internal data that a phone can store, including
emails, notes, photos, and text messages; and
not the limited kind of location data logged
on corporate servers, wrote Judge Raymond
Kethledge in the majority opinion. And the
precise GPS tracking at issue in Jones, he
said, doesn’t approach the general locational
awareness permitted by CSLI.

a string of robberies of T-Mobile and
Radioshack stores in and around Detroit. The
robber, not named in the suit, confessed soon
after the crimes and shared his cellphone
number with the FBI. The agency requested
his call records, then made a second request:
the call records and cell-site location
information for 16 additional phone numbers.
With this data, it identified the defendants in
the suit—Timothy Sanders and Timothy
Carpenter—as the alleged organizers,
getaway car drivers, and lookout men for the
robberies.

Historical CSLI is “as much as 12,500 times
less accurate than the GPS data in Jones,”
wrote Kethledge. “And cellphone locational
data are even less precise in suburban and
rural settings [than urban ones]. Areas of this
scale might encompass bridal stores and Bass
Pro Shops, gay bars and straight ones, a
Methodist church and the local mosque.”

In making this critical second request, it
asked for more than just a couple of days of
location data. In fact, it asked for more than
215 days of combined CSLI, almost seven
months of information total. The defendants
and the American Civil Liberties Union
contended that all this geographical data,
when taken together, constituted a
warrantless search.

Instead, Kethledge vindicates the federal
privacy test that has been in effect since the
late 1970s: the third-party doctrine, which
holds Americans do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to data created and
logged by an outside corporation. This law
differentiates between the private content of
a communication and the information needed
to convey it, and it’s why police need a
warrant to wiretap a phone call but not to
request call records.

“When police obtain months’ worth of
cellphone data comprising thousands of
individual locations, like they did in this case,
they should have to get a search warrant from
a judge,” said Nathan Freed Wessler, the
ACLU attorney who argued the case in front
of the Sixth Circuit, in a statement.

But the Sixth Circuit’s ruling was not
unanimous. While Judge Jane Stranch
concurred with Kethledge’s decision, she
disagreed that long-term historical CSLI was
straightforwardly Constitutional. Fourth
Amendment protection isn’t just a matter of
precision, she said, approvingly citing a line
from the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in
Skinner v. Oklahoma:

The ACLU turned to two recent Supreme
Court rulings for support. In the first, Riley v.
California in 2014, the justices held that
authorities couldn’t search a smartphone’s
data without a warrant. In the second, U.S. v.
Jones in 2012, they ruled that attaching a GPS
tracker to a car without seeking a warrant first
violated the Fourth Amendment.
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There may be situations where police,
using otherwise legal methods, so
comprehensively track a person’s
activities
that
the
very
comprehensiveness of the tracking is
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes.

earlier ruling and removes the brief circuit
split.
So the legal status of warrantless cellphone
tracking remains messy: a drive up Interstate
95 would take you through states where a
warrant is required for all CSLI, for just
historical CSLI, for some historical CSLI—
and where no warrant is required at all. The
ACLU has created a map of what protections
exist in each state. I’ve embedded it below.
There’s a good chance that it will get even
more complicated before it starts to improve:

Stranch writes that CSLI sits uncomfortably
between the law governing location
information and the law governing business
records. “I do not think that treating the CSLI
obtained as a ‘business record’ and applying
that test addresses our circuit’s stated concern
regarding long-term, comprehensive tracking
of an individual’s location without a
warrant,” she writes. Ultimately, she writes,
the Sixth Circuit or a higher court may need
to develop a new legal test to determine
exactly what kinds of search require a
warrant.
The day when the Supreme Court formulates
that test, however, may now not come for
years. In upholding the constitutionality of
warrantless CSLI requests, the Sixth Circuit
joins two other federal appeals courts, the
Fifth and the Eleventh Circuit. All three
courts have now ruled that seeking months of
historical cell-site data without a warrant is
perfectly legal.
As recently as last year, that looked like it
might change. Last summer, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that this kind of warrantless
CSLI request was illegal. The ACLU also
asked the Supreme Court to take up a case on
the same question. But the high court
declined the petition, and, in October, the
Fourth Circuit decided to rehear the CSLI
case again as a full court. This vacates its

335

Class v. United States
16-424
Ruling Below: United States v. Class, No. 13-253 -RWR- 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014).
Class sought a reversal of the judgement of the District Court where he had plead guilty,
seemingly knowingly waiving his right to appeal.
The Court states that unconditional guilty pleas traditionally waive the defendant’s right to
appeal, even on constitutional grounds.
Class appealed, claiming three counts of constitutional error and one count of statutory error. The
Court stated that none of the four counts were proper exceptions to the waiver.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether a guilty plea inherently waives a defendant's right to challenge
the constitutionality of his statute of conviction.
Rodney Class,
v.
United States.
D.C. Circuit Court
Decided on July 5, 2016
[Excerpt some citations and footnotes removed].
This appeal was considered on the record
from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and on the briefs of the
parties and oral arguments of counsel. The
Court has accorded the issues full
consideration and has determined that they
do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C.
CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below,
it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
judgment of the district court be affirmed.

Defender
served
as
stand-by
or
advisory counsel. Despite his sometime lack
of counsel, the plea followed extended
motions practice and was memorialized in a
plea agreement.

Appellant Rodney Class pleaded guilty in the
district court to possession of a firearm on
Capitol grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. §
5104(e). Although the defendant appeared
pro se at the time of the plea, he had
previously been represented by appointed
counsel and counsel had been discharged at
his request, although the Federal Public

THE COURT: If you went to trial and
you were convicted, you would have
a right to appeal your conviction to
the Court of Appeals and to have a
lawyer help you prepare your appeal.
Do you understand that?

The district court conducted a full inquiry
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11. That inquiry included the
following exchange:

[APPELLANT]: Yes.
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claim of statutory error. None of them are
properly before us.

THE COURT: Do you know what I
mean by your right to appeal?

It
is
well-established
law
that
“[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are
knowing and intelligent. . . waive the
pleading defendant{’sJ claims of error on
appeal,
even
constitutional
claims.” United States v. Delgado-Garcia,
374 F.3d 1337, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
2004). Although the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide for conditional
pleas wherein a pleading defendant may
“reserv[e] in writing the right to have an
appellate court review an adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion,”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 1(a)(2), the defendant’s
plea in the present case contains no such
reservation.

[APPELLANT]: Yeah. Take it to the
next court up.
THE COURT: All right. Now, by
pleading guilty, you would be
generally giving up your rights to
appeal. Do you understand that?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, there are
exceptions to that. You can appeal a
conviction after a guilty plea if you
believe that your guilty plea was
somehow unlawful or involuntary or
if there is some other fundamental
defect
in
these
guilty-plea
proceedings. You may also have a
right to appeal your sentence if you
think the sentence is illegal. Do you
understand those things?

The plea agreement included an explicit
waiver of appeal rights as to sentencing errors
and collateral attacks on the conviction, but
not as to alleged errors in the indictment or in
proceedings before the sentencing. Appellant
apparently believes that the lack of an explicit
waiver permits him to proceed in the present
appeal. He is in error. The holding from
Delgado Garcia quoted above reflects the
universally-recognized law of the United
States. See, e.g., Tollettv. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 266-68 (1973).

[APPELLANT]: Yeah. Pretty much.
THE COURT: Now, if you plead
guilty in this case and I accept your
guilty plea, you’ll give up all of the
rights I just explained to you, aside
from the exceptions that I mentioned,
because there will not be any trial,
and there will probably be no appeal.
Do you understand that?

There are two recognized exceptions to this
rule: “the defendant’s claimed right not to
be hauled into court at all,” and a claim “that
the court below lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case. . . .“ DelgadoGarcia, 374 F.3d at 1341 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Neither
claimed exception applies here. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the district court.

[APPELLANT]: Yes.
Tr. of Plea Hearing at 16:2—17:4, United
States v. Class, No. 13-253 -RWR- 1 (D.D.C.
Nov. 21, 2014).
On appeal, Class attempts to assert three
grounds of constitutional error and a further

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this
disposition will not be published. The Clerk
is directed to withhold issuance of the
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mandate herein until seven days after
resolution of any timely petition for rehearing
or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(l).
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“Justices To Decide If Guilty Plea Ends Constitutional Claims”
Law360
Jody Godoy
February 21, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday
to decide whether a defendant who pled
guilty to violating federal law still has the
right to challenge the law's constitutionality
on appeal, an issue the petitioner claims
could affect the majority of criminal cases.

appeals claiming vindictive prosecution or
double jeopardy, respectively.
Five appeals courts have applied those
holdings to find a guilty plea is not an
automatic waiver of a constitutional
challenge, a position Class has urged the
Supreme Court to adopt.

Rodney Class pled guilty to unlawfully
bringing a gun into a parking lot near the U.S.
Capitol but argued in both D.C. federal court
and appeals court that the law was
unconstitutional. The D.C. Circuit denied the
appeal, pointing to an earlier holding that
defendants give up the right a constitutional
challenge when they plead guilty.

On the other side, the government contends
that Blackledge and Menna actually carve out
a narrow exception for constitutional claims
involving the “power of the state to bring the
defendant into court,” not the laws
themselves.
The government argued in a brief replying to
Class' petition that his guilty plea only
preserved his right to appeal legal problems
with the plea itself. Aside from challenges to
the court's jurisdiction, the government
claims Class implicitly waived the right to
bring other appeals.

The vast majority of criminal cases end in
guilty pleas, making it important for the
Supreme Court to get the appeals courts on
the same page, Class argued in his September
petition.
“The criminal justice system is essentially a
series of plea negotiations — and yet the
parties to those negotiations are operating
without a clear understanding of the
necessary consequences of the plea itself,”
Class said.

According to Class, a third group of appeals
courts have allowed challenges to a law's
constitutionality, like Class' claim that the
law itself is unconstitutionally vague about
where the Capitol grounds end, but blocked
claims relating to the law's application, like
Class' complaint that there was no sign telling
him he was on the Capitol grounds. The
Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits are in
this camp.

The D.C. Circuit is on one side of a split over
how to apply two Supreme Court decisions
from the mid-1970s, Blackledge v. Perry and
Menna v. New York. In those cases, the high
court found that guilty pleas do not preclude
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Stephanos Bibas, director of the Supreme
Court Clinic at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, says the justices
could issue a finding that gives white collar
defendants more leeway to challenge
criminal statutes and how they are applied.
“The leverage to get white collar defendants
to plead is enormous, so the government can
kind of insulate some of these issues from
judicial review,” Bibas said.
If the court finds that an otherwise
unconditional guilty plea does not preempt
constitutional challenges, more defendants
will likely raise those issues in white collar
cases, Bibas said.
Counsel for Class did not immediately reply
to a request for comment. The government
does not comment on pending litigation.
Class is represented by Jessica Ring
Amunson of Jenner & Block LLP.
The government is represented by Finnuala
K. Tessier.
The case is Rodney Class v. U.S., case
number 15-3015, in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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“Guilty Plea's Constitutional Consequence Heads To High Court”
Law360
Daniel Wenner and Danielle Corcione
May 12, 2017

Federal criminal prosecutions almost always
result in guilty pleas.[1] When faced with the
likelihood of an expensive and lengthy trial
and, perhaps, a longer sentence for exercising
the trial right, see Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
133, 144 (2012), defendants often make what
is the sensible choice: they plead guilty. The
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes this reality
and has emphasized the importance of
prudent and sage counsel in the pleabargaining process. Id. at 143.

appeal? Well, as of now, that depends where
he lives. Whether a constitutional challenge
survives after a client pleads guilty varies by
circuit. But, the Supreme Court will consider
in Class v. United States “[w]hether a guilty
plea inherently waives a defendant’s right to
challenge the constitutionality of his statute
of conviction.” And hopefully, it will settle
the matter.
What Is the Legal Background?
In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974),
the Supreme Court allowed a defendant who
had pleaded guilty to raise a double jeopardy
claim on appeal, even though he had not
explicitly preserved that claim. In Menna v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), the Supreme
Court endorsed that view regarding a claim
of vindictive prosecution. In each of those
cases, the court reasoned that those types of
claims are not necessarily resolved by the
guilty plea because such a plea determines
only whether the government could prove the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt as
to the facts. But it does not inform whether
the prosecution was properly brought. Are
these the only situations in which an
unpreserved claim might be pressed on
appeal from a guilty plea? That question lays
at the heart of the dispute in Class.

In contemplating whether to plead guilty, a
defendant must be cognizant of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11’s requirement that
“[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea,
the court must determine that there is a
factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(3). In layman’s terms, that means that
one can’t plead guilty unless he or she is, in
fact, guilty. And what determines guilt?
Whether the person did the things that violate
the elements of the statute the defendant is
charged with having violated.
But what happens when the person did the
things proscribed, but doesn’t think the
proscription is proper? What if he thinks the
statute is unconstitutional? Must he go to
trial? May he raise that issue in the district
court, plead guilty if he loses his motion, and
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What Are the Facts?

asked the parties to brief these arguments,
held a hearing, and ultimately denied Class’
claims.

Rodney Class is a retired veteran who lived
in North Carolina. Class traveled to
Washington, D.C., in May 2013 and brought
his lawfully owned firearms, which he left in
closed bags in his locked vehicle. He parked
in a public lot about 1,000 feet from the U.S.
Capitol building. Class didn’t know the
public lot was part of the “Capitol grounds,”
which is defined by statute and is an area
where all weapons are prohibited. See 40
U.S.C. §5104(e). When Class was away from
his vehicle, a police officer saw in the cab of
the vehicle what she mistakenly believed to
be a gun holster.

The district court set the case down for trial,
but Class ultimately agreed to plead guilty
pursuant to a written plea agreement. The
plea agreement did not contain a waiver of his
right to appeal his conviction. It also did not
concede that §5104 was constitutional.
During the guilty plea colloquy, the district
judge advised Class that he could “‘appeal a
conviction after a guilty plea if [he]
believe[d] that [his] guilty plea was somehow
unlawful.’” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
8, Class v. United States, No. 16-424 (Sept.
30, 2016). He received a sentence of 24 days
of imprisonment to be followed by a 12month term of supervised release. Brief for
the United States in Opposition at 4–5, Class
v. United States, No. 16-424 (Dec. 2016).

When Class returned, he spoke with the
officer and admitted that he had weapons in
the car. Law enforcement obtained a search
warrant to search the vehicle. That search
resulted in the recovery of a number of
firearms and ammunition. Class was arrested,
and the grand jury indicted him in a twocount indictment. Class was charged with one
count of unlawfully carrying or having
readily accessible a firearm on Capital
grounds, in violation of 40 U.S.C.
§5104(e)(1), and one count of carrying a
pistol in public, in violation of D.C. Code
§22-4504(a) (2012). (Ironically, the second
count was dismissed because the statute was
ultimately deemed to be unconstitutional. See
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp.
3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).)

After his conviction was final, Class appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. He argued, in a pro se
merits
brief,
that
§5104(e)
was
unconstitutional because it unlawfully
infringed on his right to “keep and bear arms”
under the Second Amendment. The
government did not move to dismiss the
appeal. Instead, it argued in its merits brief
“that even though [Class’] plea did not
contain any express waiver of the right to
appeal his conviction, the plea inherently
waived his right to raise any constitutional
claims that accrued before he pleaded guilty,
including his constitutional challenges to the
statute.” Petition at 10. In his reply brief,
Class disputed this contention, arguing that
his constitutional challenges survived his
plea because he was not challenging his

Class waived his right to counsel. Acting pro
se, Class raised several challenges to
§5104(e)(1),
including
that
it
unconstitutionally infringed on his rights
under the Second Amendment and violated
the Due Process Clause. The district court
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“factual guilt” on appeal; rather, he was
challenging the constitutionality of the statute
to which he pleaded guilty.

The government endorsed the view of the
court of appeals that by pleading guilty
without explicitly preserving his right to
appeal the constitutionality of the statute,
Class forfeited that argument. Id. at 6–7. It
distinguished Blackledge and Menna by
arguing that in those cases, “‘the very act of
haling the defendants into court completed
the constitutional violation.’” Id. at 8
(quoting United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d
1185, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). It contended
the case was a poor vehicle for this issue
because of certain factual stumbling blocks
as well as because there is no merit to Class’
Second Amendment argument. Id. at 7, 15. It
also argued that the proper place to raise a
constitutional challenge after a guilty plea is
on collateral review in a habeas corpus
petition. Id. at 18.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed his conviction. It
reasoned that by pleading guilty, he
inherently waived his claims of error on
appeal, including his constitutional claims. It
also cited circuit precedent holding that by
pleading guilty, Class’s constitutional claims
could only survive if they were so flagrant
that he could not be haled into court to defend
himself.
What Were the Arguments Regarding a Writ
of Certiorari?
Class petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
arguing that there is a circuit split on this
issue. He noted that some circuits, including
the D.C. Circuit have “held that a plea
inherently
waives
every
underlying
constitutional claim except the double
jeopardy and vindictive prosecution claims.”
Petition at 12. Other circuits — the Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits —
have held “that a guilty plea concedes factual
guilt—but does not necessarily concede or
waive the constitutionality of the statute of
conviction itself.” Id. Finally, the Fourth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits strike “a middle
ground, allowing facial—but not asapplied—challenges to survive a guilty plea.”
Id.

Notwithstanding
the
government’s
opposition to Class’ petition, the Supreme
Court granted the writ. Complete briefing is
due in July 2017.
What’s at Stake?
The Supreme Court will decide if a criminal
defendant’s constitutional challenge to the
statute of conviction survives after a guilty
plea is entered. On balance, voluntary
agreements memorialized in a plea
agreement and accepted by the district court
are binding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)
(laying out the narrow grounds upon which a
defendant may withdraw a guilty plea). At
the plea hearing, the court engages in a
colloquy to determine if a defendant is
competent, understands the gravity of
pleading guilty, is doing so willingly, and that
there is a factual basis to accept the guilty
plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). Further,

The government opposed Class’ petition. It
argued that the Supreme Court should deny
the petition for three reasons: “The court of
appeals’ unpublished disposition is correct;
this case would be a poor vehicle for
reviewing the question presented; and no
further review is warranted.” Opposition at 6.
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a guilty “plea may be set aside only on direct
appeal or collateral attack.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(f).

incorporates the conditional language of Rule
11(a)(2). While it might end up that such
conditional language is unnecessary should
Class prevail, it would remain an important
belt-and-suspenders approach to ensure that
any defendant is not caught in Class’
position: thinking he could appeal something
raised below, even when the something is as
fundamental as the constitutionality of the
statute. After all, the government already
considered Blackledge and Menna to be
properly limited to their particular facts, and
might do the same even if Class prevails.
Foreclosing all doubt in what may and may
not be appealed might just be the preferred
tack when it comes to guilty pleas.

Seemingly following the proper procedures,
Class raised the constitutional issues in the
district court and lost. He then pleaded guilty
and appealed, not claiming he didn’t commit
the crime, but contending that the crime was
unconstitutional. He pleaded guilty, without
explicitly waving his right to appeal his
conviction, and then contested the
constitutionality of the statute on appeal.
Whether the Supreme Court endorses that
approach is anyone’s guess, but regardless of
the result in this case, the impact for
defendants general might be minor because
of conditional guilty pleas.
Certainly, Class would be in a different
position had he bargained in his plea
agreement for the right to appeal the specific
constitutional question. This happens all the
time when defendants move to suppress
evidence, such as the drugs seized in a drugpossession case. And it is explicitly
authorized by Rule 11, which allows a
defendant with the government’s consent to
“enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, reserving in writing the right to
have an appellate court review an adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). And it is the better
course to ensure that any pretrial issues that a
defendant wants to preserve should be
spelled out and explicitly carved from the
plea agreement.
Where Does That Leave Us?
Counsel should recognize the importance of
negotiating a plea agreement that
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District of Columbia v. Wesby
15-1485
Ruling Below: Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F. 3d (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Wesby and his co-plaintiffs sought relief for false arrests and violations of their Fourth
Amendment rights. They claimed that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest
them for unlawful entry because there was uncontroverted evidence that they were invited to the
property in question. The District Court granted summary judgement for the Plaintiffs and held
the District liable. The District appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the summary
judgement and upheld the District’s liability.
Question Presented: Whether police officers who found late-night partiers inside a vacant home
belonging to someone else had probable cause to arrest the partiers for trespassing under the Fourth
Amendment, and in particular whether, when the owner of a vacant home informs police that he
has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing
may discredit the suspects' questionable claims of an innocent mental state?
Whether, even if there was no probable cause to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in this regard?
Theodore Wesby,
v.
District of Columbia.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on September 2, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PILLARD, Circuit Judge: A group of latenight partygoers responded to a friend’s
invitation to gather at a home in the District
of Columbia. The host had told some friends
she was moving into a new place and they
should come by for a party. Some of them
informally extended the invitation to their
own friends, resulting in a group of twentyone people convening at the house. With the
festivities well underway, Metropolitan
Police Department (“MPD”) officers
responded to a neighbor’s complaint of
illegal activity. When the police arrived, the
host was not there. The officers reached her
by phone, and then called the person she
identified as the property owner, only to

discover that the putative host had not
finalized any rental agreement and so lacked
the right to authorize the soiree. The officers
arrested everyone present for unlawful entry.
But because it was undisputed that the
arresting officers knew the Plaintiffs had
been invited to the house by a woman that
they reasonably believed to be its lawful
occupant, the officers lacked probable cause
for the arrest. Nor was there probable cause
to arrest for disorderly conduct because the
evidence failed to show any disturbance of
sufficient magnitude to violate local law. We
accordingly affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the
ground that the arrests violated their clearly
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established Fourth Amendment rights and
District of Columbia law against false arrest.
Because the supervising police sergeant at
the scene also overstepped clear law in
directing the arrests, the district court also
correctly held the District of Columbia liable
for negligent supervision.

March 16, 2008, the MPD dispatched officers
to investigate a complaint of illegal activities
taking place at a house in Washington, D.C.
The officers heard loud music as they
approached the house and, upon entering,
saw people acting in a way they viewed as
consistent “with activity being conducted in
strip clubs for profit”—several scantily clad
women with money tucked into garter belts,
in addition to “spectators . . . drinking
alcoholic beverages and holding [U.S.]
currency in their hands.” Some of the guests
scattered into other rooms when the police
arrived. The parties dispute how fully the
house was “furnished,” but the police
observed at least some folding chairs, a
mattress, and working electricity and
plumbing.

I.
The District of Columbia and two police
officers in their individual capacities appeal
the district court’s liability determinations
resulting from the grant of partial summary
judgment against them. The court granted
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor
because, given the uncontroverted evidence
of record regarding the information known to
the sergeant and two of the officers at the
time of the arrests, no reasonable officer in
their shoes could have found probable cause
to arrest any of the Plaintiffs. The court’s
grant of summary judgment was only partial,
however, in several ways: First, the court
denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment against several other officers in the
face of factual disputes about what they knew
at the scene; the Plaintiffs then abandoned
those claims and the court dismissed them
with prejudice. Second, the court granted the
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary
judgment on claims against all of the officers
in their official capacities, dismissing those
claims, too, with prejudice. Finally, the
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was
limited to liability, leaving remedial
determinations to the jury. At a trial on
damages, the jury awarded each Plaintiff
between $35,000 and $50,000 in
compensatory damages. The only questions
on this appeal address the validity of the
partial summary judgment liability holding.
For purposes of appeal of a grant of a
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to
defendants. In the early morning hours of

One of the Defendants-Appellants, Officer
Anthony Campanale, took photographs of
the scene and, along with other officers,
interviewed everyone present to find out
what they were doing at the house. The
partygoers gave conflicting responses, with
some saying they were there for a birthday
party and others that the occasion was a
bachelor
party.
Someone
told
Officer Campanale that a woman referred to
as “Peaches” had given them permission to
be in the house; others said that they had been
invited to the party by another guest. Peaches
was not at the house. Nobody who was
present claimed to live there or could identify
who owned the house.
Another Defendant-Appellant, Officer Andre
Parker, spoke to a woman who told him that
Peaches “was renting the house from the
grandson of
the
owner
who
had
recently passed away and that [the grandson]
had given permission for all individuals to be
in the house.” The woman then used her cell
phone to call Peaches. Officer Parker spoke
to Peaches, who refused to return to the house
because she said she would be arrested if she
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did. When Officer Parker asked who gave her
permission to be at the house, Peaches told
Officer Parker that he could “confirm it with
the grandson.” Officer Parker then used the
same phone to call the apparent owner,
identified in the record only as Mr. Hughes,
who told Officer Parker that he was trying to
work out a lease arrangement with Peaches
but had yet to do so. Hughes also told Officer
Parker that the people in the house did not
have his permission to be there that evening.

who had been at the house, including
Sergeant Suber, each testified that they had
neither seen nor heard anything to justify a
disorderly conduct charge.
Sixteen of the arrestees sued five officers for
false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
officers and the District for false arrest under
common law, and the District for negligent
supervision. On cross-motions for partial
summary judgment as to liability, the district
court granted the parties’ motions in part and
denied both motions on some issues. The
court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on their
claims of false arrest against Officers Parker
and Campanale in their individual capacities,
and on the common law false arrest and
negligent supervision claims against the
District. Defendants appeal these liability
determinations.

Sergeant Andre Suber, an MPD supervisor
who was acting as the watch commander that
night, arrived on the scene after the officers
had begun their investigation. The officers
briefed Sergeant Suber, including telling him
about Parker’s conversations with Peaches
and Hughes. Sergeant Suber also spoke to
Peaches directly by phone. According to
Sergeant Suber, Peaches told him that “she
was possibly renting the house from the
owner who was fixing the house up for her”
and that she “gave the people who were
inside the place, told them they could have
the bachelor party.” As the police continued
to talk to Peaches, she acknowledged that she
did not have permission to use the house. On
that basis— and notwithstanding the
undisputed statements of both the guests and
Peaches that she had given them permission
to be at the house—Sergeant Suber ordered
the officers to arrest everyone for unlawful
entry.

II.
We review de novo a district court’s
summary judgment ruling, “apply[ing] the
same standard of review applicable to the
underlying claims in the district court.”
Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d
913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A party is entitled
to summary judgment where, “viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s
favor,” Ne. Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), this Court determines
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).

After the police arrested and transported the
partygoers
to
the
police
station,
Sergeant Suber and the lieutenant taking over
as watch commander discussed the
appropriate charges for the Plaintiffs.
According to Sergeant Suber, the lieutenant
decided to change the charge to disorderly
conduct after speaking with a representative
from the District of Columbia Attorney
General’s office. Sergeant Suber disagreed,
but the lieutenant overruled him. The officers

We begin with Plaintiffs’ entitlement to
summary judgment on their Section 1983 and
common-law false arrest claims. Because
“[t]he elements of a constitutional claim for
false arrest are substantially identical to the
elements of a common-law false arrest
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claim,” we address the merits of those claims
together. See Scott v. District of Columbia,
101 F.3d 748, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175
(D.C. Cir. 1977)). As with most false arrest
claims, Plaintiffs’ claims “turn on the issue of
whether the arresting officer[s] had probable
cause to believe that [Plaintiffs] committed a
crime.” Id. at 754. Defendants argue that the
district court erred in finding the arrests
unsupported by probable cause because, in
their view, the officers had objectively valid
bases to arrest the Plaintiffs both for unlawful
entry and disorderly conduct. In the
alternative, Defendants contend that, even if
probable cause were lacking, the officers are
shielded from liability by qualified immunity
and a common-law privilege. We address
these contentions in turn.

to District law to identify the elements of
each of those offenses. See Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). Upon
examination of the relevant statutes and case
law, we conclude that no reasonable officer
could have concluded that there was probable
cause to arrest Plaintiffs for either crime.
Unlawful Entry. At the time of Plaintiffs’
arrests, District of Columbia law made it a
misdemeanor for a person to, “without lawful
authority, . . . enter, or attempt to enter, any
public or private dwelling, building, or other
property, or part of such dwelling, building,
or other property, against the will of the
lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in
charge thereof.” D.C. Code § 22-3302
(2008). To sustain a conviction for unlawful
entry, the government must prove that “(1)
the accused entered or attempted to enter
public or private premises or property; (2) he
did so without lawful authority; (3) he did so
against the express will of the lawful
occupant or owner; and (4) general intent to
enter.” Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174,
1176 (D.C. 1985).

A.
The assessment of probable cause is an
objective one. An arrest is supported by
probable cause if, “at the moment the arrest
was made, . . . the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officers’] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing” that the suspect
has committed or is committing a
crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

The probable-cause inquiry in this case
centers on the third and fourth elements,
which together identify the culpable mental
state for unlawful entry. See Ortberg v.
United States, 81 A.3d 303, 305 (D.C. 2013).
Specifically, the question is whether a
reasonable officer with the information that
the officers had at the time of the arrests
could have concluded that Plaintiffs knew or
should have known they had entered the
house “against the will of the lawful occupant
or of the person lawfully in charge thereof,”
and intended to act in the face of that
knowledge. D.C. Code § 22-3302;
see Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 305; Artisst v. United
States, 554 A.2d 327, 330 (D.C. 1989).

Based on the undisputed facts relevant to the
knowledge the police had at the time of the
arrests, and “giv[ing] due weight to
inferences drawn” by the officers, we
consider de novo whether those facts support
a determination of probable cause to
arrest. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 697, 699 (1996). Defendants contend
that they were justified in arresting
Plaintiffs for unlawful entry and disorderly
conduct. To determine whether they had
probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were
violating District of Columbia law, we look

Probable cause “does not require the same
type of specific evidence of each element of
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the offense as would be needed to support a
conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 149 (1972). But the police cannot
establish probable cause without at least
some evidence supporting the elements of a
particular offense, including the requisite
mental state. United States v. Christian, 187
F.3d 663, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because the
offense of parading without a permit, for
example, requires knowledge that no permit
issued, “officers who make such an arrest
must have reasonable grounds to believe”
that the suspects knew no permit had been
granted. Carr v. District of Columbia, 587
F.3d 401, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

the government from proving what it must—
that a defendant knew or should have known
that his entry was against the will of the
lawful occupant.” Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 309
(emphasis added).
It is true that, if prosecuted for unlawful
entry, a defendant may raise as a defense that
he entered the building “with a good purpose
and with a bona fide belief of his right to
enter.” Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438,
439 (D.C. 1971); see United States v.
Thomas, 444 F.2d 919, 926 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308-09. But the
cases interpreting the unlawful-entry statute
are clear and consistent that such a defense is
available precisely because a person with a
good purpose and bona fide belief of her right
to enter “lacks the element of criminal intent
required” by the statute. Smith, 281 A.2d at
439; see also McGloin v. United States, 232
A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. 1967) (dismissing concern
about unintentional violations of the statute,
because “one who enters for a good purpose
and with a bona fide belief of his right to enter
is not guilty of unlawful entry”); Bowman,
212 A.2d 610, 611-12 (D.C. 1965) (“[O]ne
who enters . . . for a good purpose and with
bona fide belief of his right to enter . . . would
not be guilty of an unlawful entry . . . .”).

In this case, the officers on the scene had
three pieces of information that could bear on
whether the Plaintiffs knew or should have
known that they had entered a house against
the owner’s express will. First, the officers
had Plaintiffs’ statements that they had been
invited to some kind of party at the house,
with inconsistent and conflicting statements
about the type of party. Second, the officers
had explicit, uncontroverted statements from
Peaches and a guest at the scene that Peaches
had told the people inside the house that they
could be there. Finally, the officers had a
statement by the claimed owner of the house
that he had been trying unsuccessfully to
arrange a lease with Peaches and that he had
not given the people in the house permission
to be there.

Thus, contrary to Defendants’ argument,
Peaches’ invitation is central to our
consideration of whether a reasonable officer
could have believed that the Plaintiffs had
entered the house unlawfully. That is
because, in the absence of any conflicting
information, Peaches’ invitation vitiates the
necessary element of Plaintiffs’ intent to
enter against the will of the lawful owner. A
reasonably prudent officer aware that the
Plaintiffs gathered pursuant to an invitation
from someone with apparent (if illusory)
authority could not conclude that they had
entered unlawfully.

As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue
that Peaches’ invitation is irrelevant to the
determination of probable cause, because
whether the Plaintiffs had a bona fide belief
in their right to enter the house “simply raises
a defense for the criminal trial.” That
argument misses the mark. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals recently
reiterated that “the existence of a reasonable,
good faith belief [in permission to enter] is a
valid defense precisely because it precludes
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Ignoring the significance of Peaches’
invitation, Defendants argue that Hughes’s
statement that he had not given the Plaintiffs
permission to be in the house is dispositive
because a homeowner’s denial that he has
given permission to enter his property is
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest
for unlawful entry. We disagree. Importantly,
Hughes never said that he or anyone else had
told the Plaintiffs that they were not welcome
in the house. Peaches eventually admitted
that she did not have permission to be in the
house or to invite others, but there is no
evidence that she had told the Plaintiffs as
much. Indeed, the evidence is uniform that
the arrestees all were invited, and there is
simply no evidence in the record that they had
any reason to think the invitation was invalid.
All of the information that the police had
gathered by the time of the arrest made clear
that Plaintiffs had every reason to think that
they had entered the house with the express
consent of someone they believed to be the
lawful occupant. Accordingly, there was
no probable cause for the officers to believe
that the Plaintiffs entered the house knowing
that they did so against the will of the owner
or occupant.

(“[S]urely no one would contend that one
may lawfully enter a private dwelling house
simply because there is no sign or warning
forbidding entry.”). But those cases do not
apply here, because the Plaintiffs did not
simply find a house that appealed to them and
walk in off the street; they entered the
specified home at the invitation of someone
they reasonably believed was an authorized
inhabitant.
Defendants’
reading
of Culp and McGloin would
provide
probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry
any individual in a private dwelling without
the express permission of the owner. Such a
rule would transform the unlawful-entry
statute from one barring entry “against the
will of the owner” into one criminalizing
entry “without the express invitation of the
owner.” A brunch host who overstays her
lease does not thereby expose her invited
guests to arrest for unlawful entry, nor does a
person summoned onto property by a
stranger who appears to be the lawful
inhabitant commit the crime of unlawful
entry if she reasonably fails to recognize that
the stranger is not the owner at all, but a
traveling salesman. What the unlawful-entry
law requires is some showing that the
individual entered a place that she knew or
should have known she was not entitled to
be.

The cases on which Defendants rely do not
compel a different conclusion. Citing
to McGloin, 232 A.2d 90, and Culp, 486 A.2d
1174, Defendants argue that Hughes’s
statement was sufficient because “[t]he
offense of unlawful entry does not require
any kind of prior warning in the case of a
private dwelling.” Br. for Appellants
22. Culp and McGloin establish that an
owner of a private dwelling need not post any
sign or warning in order to express an intent
to exclude the general public. See Culp, 486
A.2d at 1177 (probable cause for unlawful
entry where the building is vacant and “the
property itself reveals indications of a
continued claim of possession by the owner
or manager”); McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91

The cases Defendants cite merely recognize
that certain factual circumstances not present
here make it reasonable to infer an
interloper’s intent to enter against the will of
the owner. McGloin, for example, upheld an
unlawful-entry conviction where the
defendant entered an apartment building, ran
up the fire escape and then onto the roof, and
said first that he was looking for his cat and
then “for a friend named DeWitt who lived in
the building,” when no one by that name
lived there. 232 A.2d at 90. In his
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defense, McGloin relied on Bowman, where
the court held that an entry into a semi-public
space was not unlawful unless the owner had
given an express “warning to keep off,”
which could be expressed verbally or “by
sign.” See McGloin, 232 A.2d at
91
(quoting Bowman, 212 A.2d at 611).
Distinguishing Bowman,
the
court
emphasized that McGloin entered “not a
public or semi-public building,” but an
apartment building containing four private
family
dwellings. Id.
Under
such
circumstances, it was “more than plain that
wandering through the building, climbing on
the roof or perching on the fire escape would
be against the will of the owner.” Id.

The arresting officers in this case, unlike
those
in McGloin and Culp,
observed
nothing inconsistent with the reason the
Plaintiffs gave for being there—a reason that
was corroborated, rather than undermined, by
the information that Peaches gave to the
officers: Peaches had invited them to her new
apartment. Defendants point to the “highly
suspicious and incriminating” activities the
officers observed in the house to bolster the
argument that the officers had no reason to
credit the Plaintiffs’ explanation for their
presence. But the officers acknowledged that,
other than the ostensible unlawful entry, they
did not see anyone engaging in illegal
conduct. Moreover, the activities they did
observe—scantily clad women dancing, bills
slipped into their garter belts, and people
drinking—were consistent with Plaintiffs’
explanations that they were there for a
bachelor or birthday party. To the extent that
people scattered or hid when the police
entered the house, such behavior may be
“suggestive” of wrongdoing, but is not
sufficient standing alone to create probable
cause. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124 (2000) (noting that unprovoked flight “is
not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,”
but is suggestive enough that, given other
circumstances,
may
justify
further
investigation). To the extent that the party
involved semi-nude dancing or stripping, it is
hardly surprising that participants would
retreat as officers entered off the street.

Culp addressed what inferences the police
may reasonably draw when a person enters a
property that appears to be vacant. In that
case, the police saw three men, including the
defendant, inside a “dilapidated” public
housing property. See Culp, 486 A.2d at
1175. The men tried to leave through the back
door when they saw the police approaching,
and the defendant “could not explain his
presence” when the officers asked what he
was doing there. Id. Culp challenged his
arrest for unlawful entry on the basis that the
police lacked probable cause to believe that
he knew he was entering the house against the
will of the occupant. See id. The court found
that the officers had probable cause to arrest
Culp because “there were sufficient
indications of efforts by [the housing
authority] to protect the property against
intruders that the officers could reasonably
conclude that [Culp] knowingly entered
against the will of the person lawfully in
charge.” Id. at 1177 (quotation marks and
ellipsis omitted). The housing authority had
made “continuous and diligent efforts to
board up the house” and at least some of the
windows remained boarded up when Culp
entered. Id.

As the district court explained, this is not a
case in which “the property was boarded up,
door latches were broken, no trespassing
signs were posted or the manner of securing
the property indicated that the owner wanted
others to keep out.” Wesby v. District of
Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 33 (D.D.C.
2012). Notwithstanding the parties’ dueling
characterizations of how furnished and
inhabited the house appeared, there is nothing
in the record suggesting that the condition of
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the house, on its own, should have alerted the
Plaintiffs that they were unwelcome. To the
contrary, that the house had sparse
furnishings and functioning utilities was
entirely consistent with one individual’s
statement to Officer Parker that Peaches was
the new tenant in a house previously
occupied by the owner’s recently deceased
grandfather.

Disorderly Conduct. Defendants argue in the
alternative that the officers had probable
cause to arrest the Plaintiffs for disorderly
conduct. At the time of the Plaintiffs’ arrests,
the relevant statute made it a crime to
“shout[] or make[] a noise either outside or
inside a building during the nighttime to the
annoyance or disturbance of any considerable
number of persons,” either with the intent “to
provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace
may be occasioned thereby.” D.C. Code § 221321(3) (2008). The “breach of the peace”
clause qualifies the remainder of the statute
“and sets forth an essential element of the
offense.” In re T.L., 996 A.2d 805, 810 (D.C.
2010).

It bears emphasizing that Defendants are
incorrect to suggest that our conclusion could
render
the
unlawful-entry
statute
“unenforceable in most circumstances” or
leave the police “powerless to make arrests
for unlawful entry” in analogous situations.
Br. for Appellants 24. The police were by no
means powerless in this case. At a minimum,
after speaking with Hughes and determining
that he had not given Peaches permission to
use the house, the officers could have told the
Plaintiffs that they lacked permission to be
there and so must leave. Had the officers
“personally asked [the Plaintiffs] to leave and
[the Plaintiffs] had refused,” such a refusal
would have supplied the probable cause the
officers needed to make an arrest for
unlawful entry. District of Columbia v.
Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C. 1993); see id.
at 37 (“The offense of unlawful entry
includes . . . cases where a person who has
entered the premises with permission
subsequently refuses to leave after being
asked to do so by someone lawfully in
charge.”).

Plaintiffs point to the evidence in the record
that the arresting officers themselves did not
believe there was evidence to support a
disorderly conduct charge. As long as the
arresting officers “had an objectively valid
ground upon which” to make an arrest,
however, the subjective knowledge and
intent of the officers is irrelevant. United
States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 566 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); see Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Thus, even where
police do not believe evidence suffices, or are
unsure which of several offenses the suspect
may have committed, an arrest is valid so
long as, on the facts of which the officers
were aware, an objective observer can
discern probable cause. See, e.g., United
States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 153 (2004)); Bookhardt, 277 F.3d
at 566; United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995
F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see
also Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d
Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[W]hen faced
with a claim for false arrest, we focus on the
validity of the arrest, and not on the validity
of each charge.”). Defendants are thus
correct that the arresting officers’ subjective

In sum, when faced with the facts and
circumstances presented in this case—and, in
particular, without any evidence that the
Plaintiffs knew or should have known they
were in the house against the will of the
owner or lawful occupant—a reasonable
officer could not have believed there was
probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs for
unlawful entry.
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belief that they lacked probable cause to
arrest the Plaintiffs for disorderly conduct is
not dispositive. What matters is whether, on
the facts the officers knew at the time, a
reasonably prudent officer could have found
that the Plaintiffs were engaging in disorderly
conduct. See Whren, 517 U.S. at
813; Bookhardt, 277 F.3d at 566.

Plaintiffs for unlawful entry or disorderly
conduct.
B.
Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ arrests
were unsupported by probable cause, we
must consider whether qualified immunity
shields the officers from liability. “An officer
is entitled to qualified immunity, despite
having engaged in constitutionally deficient
conduct, if, in doing so, she did not violate
‘clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 205 (2004)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818
(1982)).
If
Officers
Parker
and Campanale had
“an
objectively
reasonable basis for believing that the facts
and circumstances surrounding [Plaintiffs’]
arrest were sufficient to establish probable
cause,” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297,
1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)), they
would be immune from Plaintiffs’ suit for
damages.

The officers here, however, accurately
estimated the evidence as inadequate to
support probable cause to believe that the
Plaintiffs’ conduct was disorderly. As the
district court recognized, some evidence
suggested “the police were told of reports of
a loud party or loud music and some officers
heard loud music upon arrival.” Wesby, 841
F. Supp. 2d at 34. But Defendants exaggerate
the nature and quantum of that evidence as
showing that Plaintiffs had “disturbed the
tranquility and nighttime slumber of the
community residents.” Br. for Appellants 32.
The evidence on which Defendants rely
shows nothing more than that one neighbor
had called to complain about noise that
evening. A disorderly conduct violation
under District of Columbia law requires that
an arrestee disturbed a “considerable number
of persons” and acted “under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may” have
been occasioned by that arrestee’s 19
conduct. D.C. Code § 22-1321 (2008); In re
T.L., 996 A.2d at 808-09 (concluding that
defendant did not create “breach of the
peace” within the meaning of the statute
despite the fact that “some ten to fifteen
people left their town houses” in order to
observe the “clamor” that defendant caused
by yelling loudly on the street). Even viewing
it, as we must, in the light most favorable to
the Defendants, the evidence here simply
does not rise to that level.

As with all cases examining whether a
particular right was sufficiently clear, “[w]e
begin by establishing the appropriate level of
generality at which to analyze the right at
issue.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528
F.3d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see,
e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15
(1999); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639-40 (1987). Here, the question is whether,
in light of clearly established law and the
information
that
Officers
Parker
and Campanale had at the time, it was
objectively reasonable for them to conclude
that there was probable cause to believe
Plaintiffs were engaging in either unlawful
entry or disorderly conduct. See Wilson, 526
U.S. at 615. This inquiry into the “objective
legal reasonableness” of the officers’ actions

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the
officers lacked probable cause to arrest the
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parallels but does not duplicate the
reasonableness aspect of the Fourth
Amendment
probable
cause
analysis. See Johnson, 528 F.3d at 976
(describing the two Saucier steps as “distinct
but overlapping”).

established clearly, . . . there is no need that
the very action in question have previously
been held unlawful.” (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)
(“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.”).

To determine whether the officers “strayed
beyond clearly established bounds of
lawfulness,” id., we look first to “cases of
controlling authority,” Youngbey v. March,
676 F.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617). It is not
enough to reiterate that the Fourth
Amendment’s restrictions against arrest
without probable cause are clearly
established; the inquiry must be made more
contextually, at a finer level of specificity. At
the same time, “[w]e need not identify cases
with materially similar facts, but have only to
show that the state of the law at the time of
the incident gave the officer[s] fair warning”
that
their
particular
conduct
was
unconstitutional. Johnson, 528 F.3d at 976
(brackets, ellipsis, and quotation marks
omitted).

The law in this jurisdiction has been well
established for decades that probable cause to
arrest requires at least some evidence that the
arrestee’s conduct meets each of the
necessary elements of the offense that the
officers believe supports arrest, including any
state-of-mind element. See, e.g., Carr, 587
F.3d at 410-11; Christian, 187 F.3d at 667.
Under District of Columbia law, criminal
intent is a necessary element of the offense of
unlawful entry. A person who has a good
purpose and bona fide belief of her right to
enter “lacks the element of criminal intent
required” to violate the unlawful-entry
statute. Smith,
281
A.2d
at
439.
Notwithstanding Defendants’ suggestion to
the contrary, see Oral Arg. Rec. at 5:40-5:52,
District of Columbia unlawful entry law
predating the conduct in this case plainly
required that a suspect “knew or should have
known
that
his
entry
was
unwanted.” Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308
(collecting cases); see also id. at 307-08
(explaining that, although “lack[ing] some
precision,” prior discussions of “the mental
states for entry and for doing so ‘against the
will’ of the lawful occupant are both clearly
discernible and distinct”).

Turning first to the claim of false arrest for
unlawful entry, we conclude that no
reasonable officer could have believed there
was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for
entering unlawfully where, as here, there was
uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiffs
believed they had entered at the invitation of
a lawful occupant. Defendants argue that,
because no case identified by Plaintiffs had
“invalidated an arrest for unlawful entry
under similar circumstances,” it was not
clearly established that arresting Plaintiffs for
unlawful entry was unconstitutional. But that
is not the applicable standard. Qualified
immunity need not be granted every time
police act unlawfully in a way that courts
have yet to specifically address. See,
e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“To be

The controlling case law in this jurisdiction
therefore made perfectly clear at the time of
the events in this case that probable cause
required some evidence that the Plaintiffs
knew or should have known that they were
entering against the will of the lawful owner.
Defendants are simply incorrect to suggest
that the officers could not have known that
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uncontroverted evidence of an invitation to
enter the premises would vitiate probable
cause for unlawful entry. See Harlow, 457
U.S. at 819 (“[A] reasonably competent
public official should know the law
governing his conduct.”).

established standard to fair warning
principles in the context of criminal
prosecutions, and noting that “the touchstone
is whether the statute, either standing alone or
as construed, made it reasonably clear at the
relevant time that the defendant’s conduct
was
criminal”
(emphasis
added));
cf. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350
(11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “the pertinent
federal statute or federal constitutional
provision in some cases will be specific
enough to establish clearly the law applicable
to particular conduct and circumstances and
to overcome qualified immunity, even in the
total absence of case law”).

The same analysis holds true with respect to
the clarity of the Fourth Amendment right
against false arrest for disorderly conduct.
Defendants contend that the law was not
clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’
arrests because there was no case law
interpreting the specific provision of the
statute on which Defendants rely. They
correctly point out that the first case from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
interpreting subsection (3) of D.C. Code §
22-1321 was decided after the arrests in this
case. See In re T.L., 996 A.2d at 810 (“This is
the first prosecution under subsection (3) of
the statute that has come to our attention.”).
But the plain text of that provision requires
the disturbance of a “considerable number of
persons.” D.C. Code § 22-1321(3). Whatever
a “considerable number of persons” means,
surely it must mean something more than a
single individual. And yet there is no
evidence in this case that the loud music the
officers heard when approaching the house
disturbed anyone other than one neighbor
who had complained.

Finally, we reject Defendants’ arguments that
Officers Parker and Campanale cannot be
held liable under Section 1983 because (1)
they followed Sergeant Suber’s order to
arrest the Plaintiffs, and (2) they were not
each individually responsible for each of the
Plaintiffs’ arrests.
An officer is not necessarily entitled to
qualified immunity simply because he relies
on a supervisor’s decision to arrest. In
evaluating the objective legal reasonableness
of an officer’s position for purposes of
qualified immunity, approval by a superior
officer
is
“pertinent”
but
not
“dispositive.” Messerschmidt v. Millender,
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012); cf. Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986)
(rejecting the notion that approval of a
warrant by a neutral magistrate automatically
establishes qualified immunity, and requiring
instead that the officer exercise his own
“reasonable
professional
judgment”).
Defendants argue to the contrary primarily in
reliance on Elkins v. District of Columbia,
690 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2012), in which we
held that an inspector from the Historic
Preservation Office, a government agency
“charged with protecting the city’s historic
structures,” was entitled to qualified

Put differently, we believe that the language
of the disorderly conduct statute, standing
alone, was sufficient to give fair notice that
there was no probable cause to make an arrest
under these circumstances. We do not doubt,
as the In re T.L. court acknowledged, that
some parts of that provision may “pose their
own interpretive issues.” 996 A.2d at 810.
That does not mean, however, that distinct
elements of the offense were unclear in the
absence of case law interpreting the statute.
See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
266-67
(1997)
(analogizing
clearly
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immunity for her unlawful seizure of the
plaintiff’s notebooks. Id. at 559, 567- 68.
Elkins held that, although the inspector had
been
personally
involved
in
the
unconstitutional seizure, it was reasonable
for her not to know that her actions were
unlawful. See id. at 568 (“The appropriate
question for us to ask is whether it would
have been clear to a reasonable official in [the
inspector’s] situation that seizing [the
plaintiff’s] notebook was unlawful.”).
Significantly, the inspector in that case was
not a law enforcement officer at all, but “a
junior member of the search team present to
take pictures in an inspection led by police
and
her
superiors.” Id.
Moreover,
the Elkins court emphasized in granting
qualified immunity that, although the
inspector ultimately “relied upon the
judgment of her supervisor and the police
officer in charge,” she did not blindly follow
their orders. Id. Rather, she first “asked
[them] about the permissible scope of the
search.” Id. Based on those and other factors,
the court concluded that her actions, “though
mistaken, were not unreasonable.” Id.
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
244 (2009)).

reasonably competent officer faced with the
information the officers had gathered in this
case should have known that he lacked
probable cause to make an arrest.
This is also not a case, like Elkins and the
decisions cited therein, in which the
defendant officers played little or no role in
the investigation. See Elkins, 690 F.3d at 569
(citing, by way of example, a case in which
officers did not play a “key role in the overall
investigation”). Here, Officers Parker
and Campanale were actively involved in
surveying the scene and gathering
information regarding the Plaintiffs’
knowledge and reason for being in the house,
and Officer Parker spoke to both Peaches and
Hughes by phone. Both officers, moreover,
were aware of the key uncontroverted facts in
this case: that Peaches had invited the
Plaintiffs to the house, and that the Plaintiffs
had no reason to doubt that Peaches had the
right to extend such an invitation. Under
these circumstances, it was not reasonable for
the
officers
to
rely
on
Sergeant Suber’s unlawful decision to arrest
the Plaintiffs. Yet another factor present in
Elkins but missing in this case is that neither
Officer Parker nor Officer Campanale raised
the question—to Sergeant Suber or anyone
else—whether there was evidence that the
Plaintiffs knew or should have known that
their presence in the house was unauthorized.
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record
suggesting that Officer Parker or
Officer Campanale in fact disagreed with
Sergeant Suber’s determination that there
was probable cause for an arrest but carried
out the arrests because they were under
orders to do so.
That the officers were apparently as confused
or uninformed about the law as their
supervisor does not make it reasonable for
them to have arrested the Plaintiffs in reliance
on his flawed assessment. Cf. Malley, 475
U.S. at 346 n.9 (“The officer . . . cannot

The circumstances here, unlike in Elkins, do
not show the officers’ unquestioning reliance
on Sergeant Suber’s arrest order to be
reasonable. See id. at 569 (“Whether an
official’s reliance [on her supervisor] is
reasonable will always turn on several factors
. . . .”). In contrast to the historic preservation
investigator in Elkins, Officers Parker
and Campanale are police officers with the
independent authority to make arrests while
on patrol. Indeed, had Sergeant Suber not
come out to the scene, they would have had
to make the arrest determinations on their
own. Police officers charged with enforcing
the criminal statutes are expected to know the
limitations on their authority, see Harlow,
457 U.S. at 819, and, as discussed above, a
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excuse his own default by pointing to the
greater
incompetence
of
the
magistrate.”); Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at
1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (2012) (“[W]hat we said in
Malley about a magistrate’s authorization
applies still more strongly to the approval of
other police officers . . . .”). This Court has
never held that qualified immunity permits an
officer to escape liability for his
unconstitutional conduct simply by invoking
the defense that he was “just following
orders.” See generally Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statement
denying petition for rehearing) (per curiam)
(rejecting with “no hesitation” the
defendants’ argument, raised for the first time
in petition for rehearing, that the existence of
an illegal policy excused low-level
government officials from liability). Indeed,
“[i]n its most extreme form, this argument
amounts to the contention that obedience to
higher authority should excuse disobedience
to law, no matter how central the law is to the
preservation of citizens’ rights.” Id. For good
reason, this Court has never adopted such a
rule.

people in the house, and actively participated
in questioning the Plaintiffs and other key
witnesses such as Hughes and Peaches. See
id. at 566-68 (assessing whether the evidence
showed that the individual officers caused the
unlawful seizure, and noting in one instance
that the
defendant’s
actions
were
“instrumental to the seizure”). In this context,
that is sufficient to establish causation. See,
e.g., KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 F.3d 1184,
1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying qualified
immunity to an officer who relied on a
facially invalid warrant in conducting a
search because he played “an integral role in
the overall investigation” that led to the
issuance of the defective warrant); Hall v.
Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing general rule that mere presence
is insufficient to create liability, but
upholding denial of qualified immunity based
on record evidence that the officer had been
“the prime mover” in obtaining the search
warrant and “participated in the search once
inside the dwelling” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d
834, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (officers who did not
physically perform pat-down but who
“remained armed on the premises throughout
the entire search” could be held liable under
Section 1983 as “participants rather than
bystanders”).

That leaves us with the contention that
Officers Parker and Campanale cannot be
held liable because they did not personally
arrest each of the Plaintiffs. But Defendants’
argument misapprehends the applicable legal
standard for causation in the Section 1983
context. As this court has recognized, the
Plaintiffs were required to “produce evidence
‘that each [officer], through [his] own
individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’” Elkins, 690 F.3d at 564
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009)). Here, the cause of the group arrest
was the investigation and erroneous
determination regarding probable cause.
Both Officers Parker and Campanale were
the hub of that investigation: they gathered
evidence, including photographs of the

Because
the
common-law
privilege
Defendants invoke overlaps with but is
harder to establish than qualified immunity,
the Defendants’ argument on that score “fails
for essentially the same reasons already set
forth.” District of Columbia v. Minor, 740
A.2d 523, 531 (D.C. 1999) (noting that the
standard
for
common-law
privilege
“resembles the section 1983 probable cause
and qualified immunity standards . . . (with
the added clear articulation of the
requirement of good faith)”); cf. Bradshaw v.
District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 318, 323 (D.C.
2012) (explaining that 28 although the officer
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“need not demonstrate probable cause in the
constitutional sense” for privilege to attach,
the officer must show “(1) he or she believed,
in good faith, that his or her conduct was
lawful, and (2) this belief was reasonable”
(brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment insofar as it relates to
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and common-law
false arrest claims.

was on the scene and directed the officers to
make the unlawful arrests distinguishes this
case from those in which expert testimony
has been required. See Godfrey, 559 F.3d at
573 (no expert testimony required where “the
individual
with
supervisory
authority (Iverson) was present when his
employee (his personal bodyguard Kane)
committed the tortious acts”); District of
Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 797 (D.C.
2010) (no expert testimony required where
police sergeants were on the scene and
authorized arrest without inquiring into
“critical information” about the incident).

III.
Finally, we address the District’s claim that
the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Plaintiffs on their commonlaw negligent supervision claim. The District
makes two arguments in support of its
contention that the district court erred. First,
the District contends that the negligent
supervision claim must fail because the
arrests were supported by probable cause, so
either the standard of care was met or there
was no underlying tort. That argument,
however, is foreclosed by our conclusion that
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest
the Plaintiffs.

Indeed, the undisputed facts in this case
demonstrate that Sergeant Suber, one of the
District’s supervisory officials, directed his
subordinates to make an arrest that he should
have known was unsupported by probable
cause. That is sufficient to entitle the
Plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law on
their negligent supervision claim. See Phelan
v. City of Mount Rainier, 805 A.2d 930, 93738 (D.C. 2002) (“To establish a cause of
action for negligent supervision, a plaintiff
must show: that the employer knew or should
have known its employee behaved in a
dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner,
and that the employer, armed with that actual
or constructive knowledge, failed to
adequately supervise the employee.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, the District argues that it was entitled
to summary judgment on this claim because
the Plaintiffs failed to present expert
testimony regarding the standard of care. We
disagree. District of Columbia law requires
expert testimony only where “the subject in
question is so distinctly related to some
science, profession or occupation as to be
beyond the ken of the average
layperson.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d
569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427,
433 (D.C. 2000)). Moreover, although the
District correctly points out that courts often
require expert testimony where the training
and supervision of police officers is
concerned, see Br. for Appellants 43 (citing
cases), the fact that the supervising official

***
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
So ordered.
BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The court today articulates a broad new
rule—one that essentially removes most
species of unlawful entry from the criminal
code. Officers must prove individuals
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occupying private property know their entry
is unauthorized; otherwise police lack
probable cause to make arrests. Moreover,
any plausible explanation resolves the
question of culpability in the suspects’ favor.
Thus, unless the property is posted with signs
or boarded up and attempts to prevent access
have been deliberately breached, i.e., there is
direct evidence of unauthorized entry, law
enforcement’s options are limited to politely
asking any putative invitee to leave.

The court relies on two primary precedents to
raise the bar, but neither Ortberg v. United
States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) nor United
States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir.
1999) justifies the impossible standard for
finding probable cause the court now
proposes. Channeling Dr. Frankenstein, the
court cobbles together a few recognizable
parts to build a grotesque and unnatural
whole. In Ortberg, the court recognized a
bona fide belief in the right to enter as a
defense to a charge of unlawful
entry. Ortberg was not a probable cause case;
it confirmed that all elements of unlawful
entry, including requisite criminal intent, are
necessary to sustain a conviction, while
emphasizing that bona fide belief must have
some reasonable basis. It is “not sufficient
that an accused merely claim a belief of a
right to enter.” Id. at 309, n.12.

I respectfully dissent.
I
Summary resolution is inappropriate
where—as here— the probable cause
determination turns on close questions of
credibility, as well as the reasonability of
inferences regarding culpable states of mind
that officers draw from a complicated factual
context. See Media Gen., Inc. v. Tomlin, 387
F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[Where] the
material facts are susceptible to divergent
inferences . . . the [] Court ha[s] no basis upon
which to grant summary judgment.”).

United States v. Christian does impose a
higher probable cause standard but that case
is distinguishable. First, Christian involved a
specific intent crime. See generally Gasho v.
United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir.
1994) (“[A]n officer need not have probable
cause for every element of an offense[,]. . .
however, when specific intent is a required
element of the offense, the arresting officer
must have probable cause for that element.”).
Second, Christian did not require direct
evidence. The court cited Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972), acknowledging
that the circumstances surrounding an arrest
may support the necessary inference of
unlawful possession. Christian, 187 F.3d at
406. The problem with the government’s
argument in Christian was not the absence of
direct proof of criminal intent, it was the
absence of any evidence whatsoever
of unlawful possession. “[T]he officers
[therefore] lacked probable cause to believe a
crime had been committed.” Id.

The Court concludes that, as a matter of law,
no reasonably prudent officer could believe
Plaintiffs entered unlawfully because the
undisputed evidence shows an individual
with (illusory) authority invited their entry,
vitiating Plaintiffs’ formation of the requisite
intent. Maj. Op. at 11. Yet the mere presence
of an invitation by one with ostensible
authority is not dispositive if, under the
totality of the circumstances, the officers
could still conclude the suspects knew or
reasonably should have known their
invitation was against the will of the lawful
owner. See Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d
at 308 (D.C. 2013). The absence of direct,
affirmative proof of a culpable mental state is
not the same thing as undisputed evidence of
innocence.
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Today’s decision undercuts the ability of
officers to arrest suspects in the absence of
direct, affirmative proof of a culpable mental
state; proof that must exceed a nebulous but
heightened sufficiency burden that the Court
declines to specify. The Court’s decision
broadly
extends Ortberg and Christian to
apply standards designed for materially
disparate contexts to the probable cause
inquiry for general intent crimes. Cf. Pierce
v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237, 1246 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Sentences out of context
rarely mean what they seem to say.”). As a
result, the Court finds officers may only
lawfully arrest suspects for unlawful entry
where the officers have evidence
affirmatively proving each element of an
offense, including clear proof of what the
suspect knew or reasonably should have
known. But cf. 1 Corinthians 2:11 (“For who
knows a person’s thoughts except their own
spirit within them?”). This is tantamount to
an invitation to abuse vacation rentals or
houses being marketed for sale or lease where
prospective tenants can gain entry and retain
or misappropriate a key or a lockbox
combination, or leave a point of entry
unsecured. Such a heightened threshold is not
called for under our precedents. For general
intent crimes, “[p]robable cause does not
require the same type of specific evidence of
each element of the offense as would be
needed to support a conviction,” Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). The
proper inquiry is not whether the element of
knowledge was conclusively satisfied; it is
instead whether, based on the totality of the
circumstances, officers could reasonably
believe Plaintiffs committed the offense of
unlawful entry.
The Court concludes there was insufficient
evidence to support arrest because the
evidence that Plaintiffs were invitees was
uncontradicted, noting the presence of seminude dancing and the semi-furnished state of
the home are consistent with Plaintiffs’

contentions of their innocent attendance at a
party. Maj. Op. at 15–16. A jury might credit
Plaintiffs’ depiction of events, their claims of
innocent reliance upon a credible invitation,
and conclude they lacked knowledge of the
unlawfulness of their entry. However, for
purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiffs’
lack of knowledge must not be merely
“consistent” with the evidence gathered by
the police. Instead, Plaintiffs’ lack of
knowledge must be the only reasonable
inference the officers could draw.
Here the totality of the circumstances could
cause reasonable minds to question whether
Plaintiffs were as blameless as the attendees
of a Sunday brunch whose imprudent host
has overstayed her lease. Contra Maj. Op. at
13 (finding this case indistinguishable from
such a scenario). The officers responded to a
call reporting illegal activity in a home at
least some residents of the neighborhood
knew to be vacant. As the officers entered,
the partygoers’ first response was to scatter
into different rooms or hide. The house’s
interior was bare and in disarray; beyond
fixtures or large appliances, it contained only
folding chairs and food, and one room
upstairs had a bare mattress and lighted
candles—along with “females . . . that had
provocative clothing on with money in . . .
their garter belt[s].” Parker Dep. 14:12–16.
After rounding up and interviewing the
partygoers, the officers found their claim to
lawful entry was an invitation from the
house’s supposed tenant, Peaches, who was
“throwing a party.” However, Peaches was
not actually present when the officers arrived
on the scene. The partygoers also gave
inconsistent explanations for the party to
which they had allegedly been invited. Some
claimed to be attending a birthday party while
others insisted it was a bachelor’s party; in
any event, none could identify the guest of
honor.
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of the circumstances.” Jefferson v. United
States, 906 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C. 2006)
(noting observation of a one-way transfer of
an unidentified object can, in some cases,
support probable cause for an unlawful twoway exchange of drugs for money). The
officers did not ignore Plaintiffs’ potentially
exculpatory claims of invitation. See Fridley
v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874–75 (6th Cir.
2002) (officers may not ignore exculpatory
facts that tend to negate an element of an
offense). Instead, during the course of a fastmoving investigation, officers considered
and investigated Plaintiffs’ statements, and
rendered a determination that their claims of
bona fide good faith were insufficiently
credible to overcome the surrounding facts
and circumstances. See Minch v. D.C., 952
A.2d 929, 937–38 (D.C. 2008) (noting police
suspicion was reasonably based on
appellant’s evasiveness and equivocation,
particularly in a fast-moving investigation).

When ultimately reached by telephone,
Peaches admitted to inviting various
partygoers, and claimed she had permission
to enter, an assertion she quickly recanted in
a series of conflicting answers she made to
investigators before becoming evasive and
hanging up. The officers also confirmed from
the actual owner that the house had been
vacant since its last resident’s death, the
current owner was attempting to rent the
property out, and neither Peaches nor anyone
else had the owner’s permission to enter or
use the premises.
The totality of the evidence does not need to
show the officers’ beliefs regarding the
unlawfulness of Plaintiffs’ entry were
“correct or more true than false. A practical,
nontechnical probability . . . is all that is
required.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983). The surrounding context may not
convince a jury to find probable cause. But
likewise, taken in the light most favorable to
the officers, the facts are not so clear cut that
no reasonable officer could believe the
partygoers knew or should have known
Peaches’ invitation was not credible or that
their entry into the home was not properly
authorized.

The very purpose of a totality of the
circumstances inquiry is to allow law
enforcement officers to approach such
ambiguous facts and self-interested or
unreliable statements with an appropriately
healthy dose of skepticism, and decline to
give credence to evidence the officers deem
unreliable
under
the
circumstances.
Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13
(1983) (“In making a determination of
probable cause the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or
‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal
acts.”). The Court’s holding to the contrary
ensures that all but the most implausible
claims of invitation must be credited and
radically narrows the capacity of officers to
use their experience and prudent judgment to
assess the credibility of the self-interested
statements of intruders who claim to have
been “invited” and have not overtly forced
their entry into a home.

This is not a case where officers “turn[ed] a
blind eye toward potentially exculpatory
evidence in an effort to pin a crime on
someone.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365,
372 (6th Cir. 1999). Nor did officers lack
“any” evidence Plaintiffs committed the
offense of unlawful entry. See Christian, 187
F.3d at 667. The circumstances surrounding
the arrest were sufficient to support the
inference that the suspects knew or
reasonably should have known their entry
was unlawful.
“[T]he real key . . . [to probable cause] is how
[an] observed transaction fits into the totality
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also United States v. Project on Gov’t
Oversight, 454 F.3d 306, 313 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses must be left to the factfinder, and
the need to assess the credibility of witnesses
is precisely what places this dispute outside
the proper realm of summary judgment.”). A
rational juror could find the officers
reasonably believed Plaintiffs either knew, or
should have known, Peaches’ invitation was
unauthorized and that use of the house was
not otherwise permissible.

In light of the facts known to the officers at
the time of the arrests, summary judgment is
unwarranted on the question of probable
cause for unlawful entry. From their
investigation, the officers knew the house
was an unoccupied private rental dwelling,
which would likely not require a sign or
express
warning
forbidding
entry.
See McGloin v. United States, 232 A.2d 90,
91 (D.C. 1967). They further determined
none of the Plaintiffs owned or rented the
house; that the property was, in fact, vacant;
and the true owner had provided neither the
partygoers nor any tenants with permission to
enter, see Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d
1174, 1177 n.4 (D.C. 1985) (“[T]he arresting
officers’ knowledge that the property is
vacant and closed to the public is material to
a determination of probable cause.”).
Plaintiffs’ party was taking place in a home
so sparsely furnished as to be consistent with
a vacant building; the guests’ immediate
response to the presence of police was to run
and hide, an action suggestive of
consciousness of guilt; the partygoers gave
conflicting accounts about “why” the party
was being held; and they purported to rely on
an invitation from a “tenant” who was not
actually present. When reached by telephone
the “tenant” gave conflicting accounts as to
her own permission to access the home,
finally admitted she lacked any right to use
the house, and—upon further questioning—
became evasive and yelled at officers before
hanging up.

At its fringes probable cause is a nebulous
construct. See Jefferson v. United States, 906
A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 2006). (“The probablecause standard is incapable of precise
definition . . . because it deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of
the circumstances.”). In factually complex
circumstances, like the present one, the
probable cause inquiry requires weighing the
credibility of statements from multiple
parties and witnesses, and consideration of
the reasonable inferences officers may draw
from idiosyncratic facts. Resolution of such a
credibility laden and fact specific inquiry is
properly reserved for the jury. The Court errs
in concluding such a case is appropriate for
preliminary resolution at summary judgment.
See George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]t the summary
judgment stage, a judge may not make
credibility determinations, weigh the
evidence, or draw inferences from the factsthese are jury functions, not those of a judge
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . .
. Although a jury may ultimately decide to
credit the version of the events described
by [a defendant] over that offered by [a
plaintiff], this is not a basis upon which a
court may rest in granting a motion for
summary judgment.”).

Based on this evidence, taken in the light
most favorable to the officers, a reasonable
person could disbelieve Plaintiffs’ claim of
innocent entry based on a credible
invitation. See Parsons v. U.S., 15 A.3d 276,
280 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he informant’s general
credibility and the reliability of the
information he or she provides are important
factors in a probable cause assessment”); see

More troubling still, by subverting the
appropriate standard for probable cause, the
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“unlawfulness must be apparent” to support a
finding that qualified immunity does not
apply. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615; Wardlaw v.
Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(suggesting the “unlawfulness of the
defendants [must be] so apparent that no
reasonable officer could have believed in the
lawfulness of his actions”).

Court effectively excises unlawful entry from
the District’s criminal code for cases where
intruders claim they were invited and have
not obviously and forcibly obtained entrance
to a currently unoccupied private dwelling.
Such a conclusion is not compelled by either
our case law or common sense; officers are
simply not required to credit the exonerating
statements of suspected wrongdoers where
the totality of the circumstances suggests
such claims should be treated with
skepticism.

Here the pre-existing law of unlawful entry is
not so clear that a reasonable officer would
have known he lacked probable cause to
arrest Plaintiffs. The officers were faced with
an unusual factual scenario, not well
represented in the controlling case law. The
property where Plaintiffs were found was
somewhere between an occupied private
dwelling and a vacant or abandoned building.
The situation the officers encountered rests
uneasily between two distinct strands of
District law. Compare McGloin, 232 A.2d at
91 (“[N]o one would contend that one may
lawfully enter a private dwelling house
simply because there is no sign or warning
forbidding entry.”) with Culp, 486 A.2d at
1177 (noting boarded windows gives
sufficient warning an abandoned building
should not be entered).

II
Even assuming Plaintiffs’ arrests were not
supported by adequate probable cause for
unlawful entry, qualified immunity shields
the officers from individual liability for
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims because the
officers’ “conduct [did] not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982) (emphasis added); see
also DeGraff v. D.C., 120 F.3d 298, 302
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he scope of qualified
immunity must be evaluated using the []
‘objective reasonableness’ criteria.”).

Neither line of cases unambiguously
controls. The law of unlawful entry for
abandoned properties has traditionally dealt
with obviously decrepit buildings, e.g., Culp,
486 A.2d 11 at 1175 (noting the house was
missing a rear door, its windows were
shattered, and the interior was in
“shambles”), while unlawful entry of private
dwellings has generally dealt with
traditionally
occupied
residences,
apartments, or semipublic buildings. See,
e.g., McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91; Bowman v.
United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611-12 (D.C.
1963). Neither line of cases encompasses a
scenario where individuals claim to be the
social guests of a tenant of a (vacant) property
to which the tenant has no actual possessory

For purposes of qualified immunity,
“‘[c]learly established’ . . . means that “[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable [officer] would
understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 61415 (1999). While, “[t]his is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question
has been previously held unlawful,” id.,
courts should nonetheless “examine the
asserted right at a relatively high level of
specificity, and on a fact-specific, case-bycase basis,” O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652
F.3d 662, 668 (6th Cir. 2011). And in
reviewing the pre-existing law, the officers’
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interest—much less a scenario where the
putative tenant is herself not present on the
scene and refuses to otherwise cooperate with
officers’ ongoing investigation. Moreover, to
the extent the pre-existing law is broadly
comparable, a reasonable person could find it
supports an officer’s finding of probable
cause where a trespassers claim of invitation
is deemed insufficiently credible. See,
e.g., McGloin, 232 A.2d at 90–91 (upholding
the conviction of person found in nonpublic
areas of a private apartment building, despite
his excuse he was looking for a cat or a friend
who lived in the building); Kozlovska v.
United States, 30 A.3d 799, 800–801 (D.C.
2011) (upholding the conviction of a woman
who claimed an employee permitted her to
use the building).
Thus, in the absence of pre-existing case law
clearly establishing the contours of Plaintiffs’
rights, the officers were shielded by qualified
immunity when, acting under color of state
law, they reasonably arrested plaintiffs for
unlawful entry. The case law of course
requires officers to have some evidence the
alleged trespassers committed the offense of
unlawful entry. See Maj. Op. at 21–22. Yet
nothing in the District’s law requires officers
to credit the statement of the intruders
regarding their own purportedly innocent
mental state where the surrounding facts and
circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of
such claims. The officers were therefore
entitled to the protection of qualified
immunity and the “breathing room” it gives
them to make reasonable— albeit potentially
mistaken—judgments
under
novel
circumstances unexplored by the law when
they took the challenged action. Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
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“Supreme Court to hear case about arrests at party in D.C. house”
Robert Barnes
Washington Post
January 19, 2017

The party in the otherwise quiet Washington
neighborhood had gotten loud by the time
D.C. police officers Andre Parker and
Anthony Campanale arrived.

It is unclear whether it will be considered in
the court’s current term or held over for the
term that begins in October.
D.C. Attorney General Karl A. Racine told
the justices in a petition that the court of
appeals decision — finding that the officers
lacked probable cause for the arrests because
the partygoers said they were not trespassing
but were guests of Peaches — failed to reflect
“the real world in which police officers
function.”

Several women were dressed only in bras and
thongs, with money in their garter belts. The
unoccupied residence in Anacostia appeared
to have been turned into a strip club, the
officers thought. The partygoers said they
had been invited by a woman named
“Peaches,” although some knew her as
“Tasty.” In the end, Parker and Campanale
arrested 21 people.

“The court of appeals’ decision undercuts an
officer’s ability to use his or her experience,
judgment, and direct observations to assess
the credibility of a suspect’s innocent
explanation,” Racine wrote. “Officers will
second-guess
themselves
and
forgo
enforcement of the law, fearing that a judge,
far removed from the scene and years later,
might make a different credibility judgment
and then hold them personally liable.”

The legal wrangling that followed those
arrests in 2008 resulted in a nearly $1 million
award against the officers and the city, and
divided the judges of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On Thursday,
the case made it onto the Supreme Court’s
docket.
The court announced that it will consider
whether there was probable cause for the
officers to make the arrests — the partygoers
said they were invited to the house, and they
were never prosecuted — and whether the
officers deserve immunity for their actions.

Sixteen of the 21 people arrested sued after
no charges were brought. A district judge
ruled against the police officers, saying that
“nothing about what the police learned at the
scene suggests that the [partygoers] knew or
should have known that they were entering”
against the property owner’s will.

The case appears to have split the Supreme
Court justices. They considered nine times
whether to accept the case before agreeing to
review it.

After a trial, the partygoers were awarded
$680,000 and the police officers were
ordered to pay attorney costs, which brought
the total to just under $1 million.
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the person lawfully in charge” of the
property, Williams wrote. In this case, the
partygoers had been invited by Peaches, “a
woman whom they reasonably believed to be
its lawful occupant.”

A divided panel of the appeals court upheld
the award. And two judicial heavyweights on
the court, liberal Cornelia T.L. Pillard and
conservative Brett M. Kavanaugh, squared
off over whether the entire circuit should
review the decision.

The case is District of Columbia v. Wesby.

Kavanaugh said the panel’s opinion eroded
the protection for police officers who may
make an honest mistake when trying to carry
out their duties.
“Two D.C. police officers have been held
liable for a total of almost $1 million,”
Kavanaugh said in a statement joined by
three other judges who wanted to rehear the
case. “That equates to about 20 years of aftertax income for the officers, not to mention the
harm to their careers. For what? For arresting
for trespassing a group of people who were
partying late at night with drugs and strippers
in a vacant house that the partiers did not own
or rent.”
But Pillard replied that the panel’s opinion
did not change existing protections for police
officers at all.
“Our opinion does not ignore or weaken that
important protection, which gives officers the
necessary ‘breathing room’ to perform their
difficult, dangerous jobs and safeguard the
public,” she said. “It simply finds that a
reasonable officer could not conclude, based
on the information before these particular
officers, that there was probable cause.”
Ted J. Williams, an attorney for Theodore
Wesby and the others who were arrested, had
told the Supreme Court that it did not warrant
the justices’ attention.
Under D.C. law, a person is guilty of
unlawful entry only if he knew or should have
known that he was entering the property
“against the will of the lawful occupant or of
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“Supreme Court to hear case about party in vacant DC house”

Associated Press
Mark Sherman
January 19, 2017

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme
Court will hear a case in which people
arrested for having a party in a vacant house
sued police for violating their constitutional
rights and won.

The group was arrested for trespassing, a
charge later changed to disorderly conduct
and then dropped altogether. But the 16
people sued for false arrest and were awarded
$680,000.

The justices said Thursday they will review
lower court rulings in favor of 16 people who
gathered in a house in Washington about
three miles east of the nation’s Capitol for a
party.

The issue for the court is whether the officers
had sufficient reason to arrest the group for
trespassing. The court also will determine
whether the officers should be shielded from
liability even if their actions are found to
violate the law.

Police arrested the group after no one could
identify whose house it was, some said it was
a birthday party and others said it was a
bachelor party. No one could identify the
guest of honor. Several women were scantily
clad, with money hanging out of their garter
belts. The officers said that the scene
resembled a strip club, according to court
papers.

A panel of the federal appeals court in
Washington upheld the judgment, but four
other judges on the court said that the officers
should have been protected, citing a string of
Supreme Court decisions.
The case, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 151485, will be argued in April or the fall.

Several of the partygoers said someone
named “Peaches” gave them permission to
have the party.
But when an officer later contacted the
purported owner of the home, he denied
having given anyone permission to have a
party.
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“Chemerinsky: When can government officers be held liable?”
ABA Journal
Erwin Chemerinsky
February 2, 2017

In the last few years, police killings of
unarmed African-American men—Michael
Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Laquan
McDonald, Freddie Gray and others—have
received great publicity. There is an urgent
question of how to hold the police
accountable to prevent and remedy
constitutional violations.

law that every reasonable officer should
know; it must be a right that is established
“beyond dispute.” In many recent cases, the
Court has found that police sued for
excessive force are protected by qualified
immunity. For example, on January 9,
in White v. Pauley, the Supreme Court, in a
per curium opinion, reversed the Denverbased 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and
held that officers were protected by qualified
immunity for a shooting that killed a man in
his home.

This term, the Supreme Court has several
cases addressing when law enforcement
officers can be sued for money damages.
In each of the cases, the court has to consider
whether the police violated the Fourth
Amendment and if so, whether the officers
can be held liable or whether they are
protected by “qualified immunity.” All
government officials when sued for money
damages can raise immunity as a defense. For
some tasks, there is “absolute immunity,”
which means that the officer cannot be held
liable no matter how egregious the
constitutional violation. For example,
absolute immunity exists for prosecutors for
their prosecutorial tasks, legislators for their
legislative tasks, judges for their judicial
tasks and law enforcement officers for their
testimony in court.

There are several pending cases that will
cause the court to examine when law
enforcement officers can be held liable.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, Ashcroft v. Abbasi, Hasty
v. Abbasi
These three cases, which were consolidated
for oral arguments, involve Muslim men who
were apprehended and detained after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. They
were then held for months in solitary
confinement in a super-maximum security
wing of a federal prison. They claim that they
were subjected to harassment and abuse.
They maintain that this was not because of
any evidence that they were dangerous, but
solely because of their race and ethnicity.

If there is not absolute immunity, a
government official can assert “qualified
immunity.” The Supreme Court has said that
this means that the officer can be held liable
only if he or she violates clearly established

The Manhattan-based 2nd U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims
survived a motion to dismiss. The Supreme
Court granted review and there are several
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issues before the court. Do the plaintiffs have
a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics (1971), which held that federal
officers can be sued for money damages for
violating the Constitution? Unlike 42 U.S.C.
§1983, which allows state and local officers
to be sued for violating the Constitution and
federal laws, there is no similar statute
authorizing
suits
against
federal
officials. Bivens held that a cause of action
for money damages can be derived from the
Constitution, in that case from the Fourth
Amendment. But the court repeatedly has
narrowed Bivens and there is the question of
whether plaintiffs have a claim for money
damages in this situation.

Texas, and Juarez, Mexico. They were
playing a game where they would run up the
culvert’s northern incline, touch the U.S.
fence, and then scamper back down to the
bottom. They were unarmed. A border agent,
Jesus Mesa, fired his gun at Hernandez, who
was about 60 feet away. Hernandez was
struck by the bullet and killed. Mesa was in
the United States; Hernandez was in Mexico.
Whether the boys were throwing rocks at
Mesa, and whether there was “alien
smuggling” occurring, is very much in
dispute between the parties.
The federal district court dismissed all claims
and the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. There are a
number of issues before the Supreme Court.
Does the Fourth Amendment, which
prohibits excessive force by law enforcement
officials, apply? In United States v. VerdugoUrquidez (1990), the court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to law
enforcement officials acting outside of the
United States. Does that apply here when
Mesa was in the United States when he fired
his gun, but the victim was on the other side
of the border? Also, like in the Abassi cases,
there are questions of whether there is a cause
of action under Bivens and, if so, whether the
defendants are protected by qualified
immunity.

Also, there is the question of qualified
immunity. Even if there is a cause of action,
did the defendants violate clearly established
law that every reasonable officer should
know? Finally, there is the question of
whether the plaintiffs’ complaint was
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in
light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case with similar
facts. The plaintiffs in these cases amended
their complaint after Ashcroft v. Iqbal and
maintain that the additional, detailed facts are
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
The cases were argued on Jan. 18 of this year.
Only six justices are participating. Justice
Sonia Sotomayor is recused, likely because
the cases were before the 2nd Circuit when
she was a judge there, and Justice Elena
Kagan, is recused, likely because she the
Solicitor General of the United States when
the cases were considered there.

The plaintiff presents this to the court as
applying settled law: the Fourth Amendment
prohibits excessive force by a law
enforcement officer in the United States and
Mesa was in the United States when he fired
his gun. The defendant argues that this is a
case about extraterritoriality and the Fourth
Amendment doesn’t apply, or at the very
least a novel situation where there should not
be a Bivens suit available and qualified
immunity should be a defense. Hernandez v.

Hernandez v. Mesa
In 2010, a 15-year-old boy, Sergio
Hernandez, was playing with three friends in
the concrete culvert separating El Paso,
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Mesa will be argued on Tuesday, February
21.

these cases will be important in defining the
ability to use civil suits to hold the police
accountable.

District of Columbia v. Wesby
On Jan. 19, the Supreme Court granted
review in yet another Fourth Amendment
case with a qualified immunity issue: District
of Columbia v. Wesby.
Police officers found late-night partiers
inside a vacant home. Some of the partiers
told the officers that they had been invited to
the house by a woman whom they believed to
be its lawful occupant. That woman
confirmed to the officers by telephone that
she had invited them. The officers, however,
subsequently learned that she was not in fact
a lawful resident of the house. The officers
arrested the partiers for trespassing.
Ultimately, all of the charges were dismissed
and 16 individuals filed a civil suit against the
officers under §1983 for violating the Fourth
Amendment. The federal district court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs, holding that there was not
probable cause for their arrest because the
partiers reasonably believed that they had the
right to present in the house and also
concluding that the officers were not
protected by qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court granted review on two
questions: whether the officers had probable
cause to arrest under these circumstances and
whether even if there was no probable cause
to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. No oral
argument date has been scheduled.
All of these cases come to the court in the
context of great national attention to police
misconduct and the demands for action by
Black Lives Matter and others. Together
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